The chief targets of the sapper cell are government buildings, communication and transportation centers, port and storage facilities, as well as a range of individually smaller targets, such as people, vehicles in the streets, key enemy personnel in public concentrations, etc.

Sapper cell members, of necessity, are bolder and more willing to take risks. And it is policy for them to do so (unlike PAVN and Main Force units, which generally are conservative in terms of risk-taking). They are for the most part strongly dedicated and highly militant. Recruiters seek chiefly the young, because they are more easily influenced in their thinking, are more willing to run risks, physically are better able to carry out their assignments, are less likely to question the arrangements for an operation, and are less apt to be or become double agents. Optimum age seems to be around 18; seldom is a sapper older than the late 20’s (an exception being the specialist), and it is not uncommon to find 14-year-olds playing a key role in an operation.

Since many of these now come from the North Vietnamese military, there is a penchant for the military approach. For example, in assassinations grenades or satchel charges are preferred to a pistol; a mortar at a distance is preferred to a satchel charge up close. The approach in effect is to think as a soldier, not as a saboteur, to fight a personal or small-unit war rather than a “clandestine” one, to substitute surprise for covertness, shock of impact for scalpel precision, escape from an operation under cover of a barrage of fire rather than by stealth. The result of the terror act may be the same, but the character often is quite different.

Bold they often are, but seldom foolhardy. Public reports over the years of “death squads” and “suicide missions” probably are exaggerated. The number of fanatical true believers indifferent to pain or death is as small in the communist ranks as anywhere else. What often appears to be a suicide mission actually is an act of credulity. For example, a 14-year old boy is persuaded that he can hop off a motorcycle, carry a satchel charge through a gate of a police headquarters, hurl his charge and be out and away before the enemy is alerted. He may know (or he may not be told) that on the roof of that headquarters is a 50 caliber machine gun, manned day and night, and aimed directly at the gate. If he does know it, he believes, or has been convinced, that surprise and speed will still permit his successful departure. When he is shot at the gate his act is put down as another fanatic communist freely sacrificing himself for the cause.
The communists later, of course, have no interest in correcting such a mistaken view.

Training Terrorists

One of the clearest picture of the purpose and direction of communist terror programs comes from an inspection of training efforts.

Camp Ba Thu in the “parrot’s beak” of Cambodia, due west of Saigon, is the chief training area for communists slated to engage in terror work. About one hundred students are in this area at any one time taking the basic two-month elementary course called “Armed Security Training.” Others in smaller numbers receive more advanced or specialized training. Students either are Northerners who have had previous training at Camp Xuan Mai in North Viet-Nam, or local communists who have come in for the training.

About 40 percent of the coursework at Ba Thu is political indoctrination, all incorporated into one lecture session titled, “Role of the Revolution During the General Uprising Period.” (In the communist view; Viet-Nam is now in the stage of Tong khoi nghia or general uprising, the final stage before victory.) Specific topics include: “Situation in the South,” “Historical Analysis,” “Meaning of the General Uprising and the General Offensive,” “Role and Responsibility of Armed Security.” The mission of the individual, he is told, is:

“To eliminate tyrants, local administrative personnel, traitors, those who undermine our movement and those who terrorize the people; to protect the revolutionary organs; to heighten the prestige of the Revolution and lower the prestige of the enemy; to create conditions favorable to binh van (troop proselytizing) or capturing enemy personnel, especially those who can supply us with information, especially if they steal enemy documents which help us understand enemy plans and estimates. The main objective of the Revolution is the government. In order to oust the puppet government and seize power for ourselves, we must resort to

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5. As a result of the Cambodia sanctuary strikes in May 1970, launched as this monograph was going to press, this sentence should be in the past tense: Camp Ba Thu was the training center; it probably was moved north, to southern Laos.
revolutionary violence, both military and political, also to oppose the enemy’s anti-revolutionary violence. The Armed Security Force in particular and the People’s Security Agency in general should be the main tools of the Party and the Revolution in this effort.”

The rest of the course work consists of classes in: “Techniques of Security” (protection of fixed installations or simple guard duty); “How to Set Ambushes” (which means how to kidnap and how to assassinate as well as how to set ambushes for the same purposes); “Reconnaissance” (casing the target and route planning); “Methods of Camouflage and Disguise”; “Tactics of Urban Warfare”; and something called “Personnel” which apparently deals with handling amateur collaborators and, an increasingly common phenomenon, the hired terrorist whose services are engaged for a single operation for which he receives a considerable sum of money. Students also receive training in weapons handling, if they have not already acquired it elsewhere; the basic weapon is the AK-47. There also is training in the use of pressure—and electrically-detonated mines, and use of B-40 and B-41 rockets. In the physical education classes, emphasis is on silent swimming.

Toward the end of the training period those students who are part of the communist military structure (as opposed to those who operate under the control of the Party) are formed into four-man teams; a chief, who does the actual detonating of the charge and thus has the most dangerous assignment; a logistics man responsible for assembling the explosives and detonators; a reconnaissance man who maps the target as well as the routes to be followed before and after the operation; and an outside man, who is responsible for transportation and who acts as the “cover” man during the getaway, that is, as a counter-pursuit force. These teams, singly or in clusters, then receive team training both at the sand table and in mock operations.

Operations

Communist terror activity seldom is conducted in isolation. Almost every act is part of a program and every program an integral part of some project which the leaders feel

6. From the captured notebook of a cadre who had attended the course at Ba Thu. Circa early 1969.
is required at the moment: the refugees must be forced back to their home villages, American casualties must be increased, villagers must be discouraged from voting in village council elections, etc. Normally the activities of the various cells are integrated into the perennial "offensives" which communist planners love to divide into three phases and mount as "Autumn-Winter" and "Spring-Summer" offensives or "Dry Season" and "Wet Season" campaigns. Between "offensives" the cells are available for other assignments, but also during these periods they do a good deal of training.

The specific acts of terror as well as the intent and purpose behind them can be quickly understood by skimming the Appendix, "Terror: The Record", and, in fact, that is the reason it was included in this monograph.

Especially in Central Viet-Nam, the terror units operate under a kind of Stakhanovite quota system. The six-month quota imposed on six units (probably district special activities squads) in southern Phu Yen and northern Khanh Hoa Provinces for the last half of 1969 is reproduced below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Designation</th>
<th>To Be Annihilated</th>
<th>To Be Captured &amp; Re-educated (At District Centers)</th>
<th>To Be Re-Educated (At Village Level)</th>
<th>Warning Letters To Be Sent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-5</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The quota takes note of four of the five major activities of various terror units: assassination; kidnaping (with indoctrination and later release, or with subsequent assassination); "re-education" in the village (a whole range of indoctrinational, agitational and propaganda efforts by special action teams, armed propaganda teams and agit-prop teams); and psychological intimidation (those on the warning letter list may later be moved to the assassination list; in any event the warning letter is cheap and can be highly effective in individual cases). The fifth activity, beyond the capability of the units for which this quota was designed, is the use of explosives for terror purposes.
The tricks of the terror trade are endless:

• Poisoned cigarettes given eleven police officers in Kien Hoa province; one died, the others were hospitalized.

• Two 12-year old boys in Binh Dinh Province were kidnapped by a Special Activities Squad. The chief held their heads under water until they promised to throw two grenades in their village, which they did, killing 27 persons.

• Poison injected into bottles of wine with hypodermic needles. Or wine bottles used as grenade carriers: the bottom is cut off the bottle, a hand grenade fitted snugly into the bottle with the pin removed and the bottom cemented back on. When the bottle is hurled it breaks, releasing the firing arm (an excellent way to conceal a grenade when traveling in the city).

• Doors, drawers or automobile engines booby trapped; booby traps of explosives, but also of poisoned darts.

• Assassinations directed against the very best and the very worst enemy officials, against the highly popular and effective civil servant and against the most corrupt and oppressive local official, stimulating a policy of mediocrity.

• The bicycle or motorcycle can be a death instrument, with its hollow tubular frame packed with plastique and the timing device fixed under the saddle. The terrorist rides into the area, leans his machine against the building to be destroyed, sets the fuse and walks off.

• The use of a B-40 rocket for purposes of extortion. For example, a Chinese transportation company owner is delinquent in his payments to the communists. One of his trucks, traveling over government-controlled roads (meaning that a communist unit would not dare openly stop the truck) is blown up from a distance, with a rocket; there is virtually no risk to the communists and the pay-off is high, as the owner doesn’t want to lose another truck.

Increasingly we have seen develop in Viet-Nam the large scale terror attack, a commando-type raid by sappers but with the purpose of terrorizing rather than accomplishing some military objective. The raid on the U.S. Sixth Convalescent Hospital at Cam Ranh Bay, August 7, 1969, may be
an ominous foreshadowing of this new face of communist terror: a 100-man sapper force infiltrated the hospital compound, detonated several dozen charges, shot some American patients and then vanished without a casualty to themselves. The capability, scope and importance of this sort of mass terror operation has broadened steadily in the past 18 months. We can expect it to continue to grow in importance. More communist resources will be allocated to it, more emphasis will be placed on it doctrinally. This is a reflection of the steadily changing nature of the war since mid-1968. For the communists it is a trend toward less costly warfare, especially less lavish expenditure of men and materials. A sapper battalion attack is more economical than an assault by far larger numbers of PAVN. Not only does it allow the better husbanding of resources, it also provides greater precision in strikes at those enemy targets which represent maximum threat at the moment—for example, the Revolutionary Development cadres, or the People’s Self-Defense Force. Therefore it is quite possible that the communist leaders may in the 1970’s restructure the war and put the chief burden of the struggle on the shoulders of the terrorist. Indeed, an increasingly impressive body of evidence from captured documents points clearly toward this eventuality.

Limitations

We would be remiss if we did not consider the limits which exist in communist use of terror, for they are many and significant. The chief limit, of course, is that imposed by the other side, the so-called counter-terror measures which for the most part are nothing more than patient detective and police work; these have always been important but in recent months have at times become impressive. Poor quality of personnel is probably the second greatest limitation. Closely allied to this is the matter of individual morale. Doctrine also can be a limitation. Some examples:

• The Saigon police intercept a shipment of explosive materials and detonating devices en route to Saigon but without communist knowledge. Experts then sabotage them. For example a fuse is removed from a hand grenade. Or the fuse is changed from a five-second to a half-second one. Or the explosive is replaced with material that looks identical but is harmless. The word which eventually gets back to the terror teams is that their equipment is faulty.
GVN penetration agents in a sapper squad are under orders to watch for signs of faint-heartedness or loss of zeal among members. If an agent detects this in a member, he carefully reveals himself and offers to arrange the next assignment as a staged affair, appearing to be genuine but run with the cooperation of the police and thus involving no danger to the faint-hearted member.

On several occasions naval patrol boats have seen underwater explosions from a distance and upon investigation have found the remains of what undoubtedly were water sappers who had blown themselves up. Allied forces have captured several stockpiles of water sapper explosive devices and equipment: magnetic-acoustic mines, pressure-influence detonators, torpedoes and scuba-diving equipment, all of it communist-bloc manufactured and of first-rate quality. Yet there has been surprisingly little water sapper activity. Probably this is a limitation imposed by lack of trained and experienced water sappers, who are much harder to come by than is good water-sapper equipment.

Getting and keeping safe houses, especially in Saigon, is a steadily more difficult task. Captured documents indicate that the leadership does not expect any safe house to remain secure more than six months.

Lack of skill means more accidents. On May 15, 1969, for example, a taxi exploded in Saigon’s Fifth District. Later, it was determined that a team had been transporting three rockets and 88 pounds of plastique and because of carelessness or ignorance, or sabotage, had accidentally set them off. Sappers carrying concealed charges in Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive failed to carry out their assignment because they got lost (and aroused suspicions with inquiries as to location of target; one passer-by notified police who arrested them).

Morale is a major limitation. Terrorists must be zealously energetic or they are nothing. Losses in their ranks have a cumulative effect, tending to cause survivors anxiety about living on borrowed time because of the discouraging prospect of the arrival of new and usually green recruits with all the consequent hazards. The knowledge that GVN penetration agents are everywhere, reporting and internally sabotaging the effort, must have a particularly corrosive effect.
Limits are recognized frankly by communist theoreticians, writing in cadre handbooks and even publicly. In earlier years especially, cadres were advised to use terror judiciously, selectively and only sparingly. Terror, they were told, was largely useless against a dedicated opponent, such as the South Vietnamese Catholics. In general the theoreticians seemed to regard terror as a technique which provides quick but rapidly diminishing returns, a weapon of the weak that would fall into disuse as power grew. Writings also repeatedly make the point that terror methods can succeed only when the objectives of the terrorist are widely and fully supported by the general population (the example always given is the Viet Minh war against the French). One concludes that had these theoreticians had their way, terror would never have grown to the proportion that it did, nor would it have become integral in virtually all communist programs, as is the case now.
Appendix: Terror—The Record

To provide the reader with a sense of the all-encompassing nature of communist terror in Viet-Nam, representative, but by no means comprehensive, examples have been selected from books, government files, newspaper morgues and International Control Commission reports.

Viet Minh Terror

The Viet Minh war against the French was marked by considerable use of terror, not only against the French but against Vietnamese who did not support the Viet Minh.

Beginning in the final days of World War II, the communists, under Vo Nguyen Giap, destroyed all non-communist nationalist leaders they could run to earth.

In the Viet Minh controlled areas during the war, “enemies of the Resistance” were systematically eliminated.

Something of a blood bath took place following victory in 1954, one which would have been greater had not some 900,000 North Vietnamese escaped to the South in Operation Exodus.

Terror again surged upwards in 1956 with the so-called land reform program, which actually was destruction of the natural leader class in the North Vietnamese villages. A conservative figure of the number who died at this period is 50,000; some estimates run as high as a half-million (population of North Viet-Nam at the time was about 14 million).

Accounts of various communist terror activity are found in the standard works on the Viet Minh war, including: Bernard Fall, Le Viet Minh; Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled; Lucien Bodard, The Quicksand War; George K. Tanham, Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina. The later terror, during the so-called land reform period, is detailed in Harvey Smith et al, Area Handbook for North Viet-Nam; Hoang Van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism; Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of French Indo-China; and Dennis Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Viet-Nam.

Some typical quotations follow:

“That city (Saigon) was in the hands of the Viet-Minh. For a month on end life there was a nightmare. During the
day everything seemed quiet. Fear came back with the twilight. The darkness outside was full of prowling Viet Minh. It was an endless vigil. In every house the waiting had the same aspect. The rooms were lit for sake of face. The men played cards with their only weapons, the kitchen knives, within hand’s reach. From time to time they broke off to calm their wives overtaken by hysteria. The children, all put into the same bed in a next-door room, trembled with fear and were sick on the mosquito netting. The terror mounted. From mouth to mouth ran the names of men who had been hacked to pieces, of women who had been raped and cut open, of children who had been maimed. The shrieks of those who were being tortured to death could be heard. The Viet-Minh had set up Resistance camps in the suburbs and there they took their hostages, burying them alive, with only their heads showing above the ground. The horror reached its culminating point ... when some one hundred men were dismembered, slashed to pieces in unimaginably horrible circumstances."


“To make force a Viet Minh monopoly required a great deal of preventive violence. ... Like all fanatics whether political or religious who believe that they are called upon to save souls or to realize great worldly projects, the communists had no qualms when it came to advancing their cause by assassination. ... It was not difficult for people convinced of the virtue of their cause to kill others and feel they had performed a good deed. ... Success was achieved through a political strategy in which terror, always subordinate to tactical considerations, played a secondary though at times a rather important role."

“The Communist policy of killing all true nationalist opponents of the Viet Minh also had deep and lasting political consequences for the future of Viet-Nam. It is one of the reasons for the weakness of the non-Communist national movement which, its best and most promising young candidates murdered, was deprived of scores of qualified leaders, enough to guide it for many years to come.”

“In 1955 North Viet-Nam launched a three-year program of economic rehabilitation and land distribution... motivated in part by the regime’s attempt to strengthen its control over the population by purging the landlords whom they regarded as reactionary. In implementing the redistribution measures the Communist regimes used terror and other coercive means resulting in the death of more than 50,000 persons between 1954 and 1956.”


“The Land Reform was carried out in two successive campaigns (1953-1956)... The second campaign was interrupted in 1955 owing to the mass exodus of nearly a million people from North to South Viet-Nam.... The communists temporarily halted the terror in order to avoid an even larger exodus.... But after the closing of Hai Phong, the last seaport through which people could escape, they at once resumed their campaign.... The number of victims in this campaign has never been made public, but if we are to believe M. Gerard Tongas, a French professor who remained in Hanoi up to 1959 and who claims to have accurate information: ‘This indescribable butchery resulted in one hundred thousand deaths.’”


“These ‘mistakes’ (in the DRV Land Reform program) had been committed by the Communist cadres in charge of this operation who, when they were faced with disconcerting discovery that no landlords existed in many of the (Red River) delta villages, had proceeded to create such a class by resorting to murder and torture in order to wring the statutory confessions of past ill-treatment of tenant farmers from villagers who either cultivate their own meagre holdings or in some cases possessed no land at all. The cost in lives and suffering of this somber farce was revealed in December 1956 when 12,000 victims of the operation were released from the forced labor camps to which they had been unjustly condemned; the number of those who had been
murdered was unofficially estimated at between ten and fifteen thousand.”


“The periodical campaigns of systematic terror, to ensure obedience and loyalty, followed the succession of ideas put into practice in China (on land tenure problems). In 1954 village murders of alleged traitors had been perpetrated out of hand as acts of vengeance; from 1951 onward the purpose of terror became indoctrination in this sense and victims were picked out by denunciation, more or less at random, according to their social standing, to be made examples of at people’s trials. But the greatest of the terror campaigns in the DRV did not begin until 1953. . . . The intention seems to have been less the elimination of any particular class of people than eradication from everybody’s mind, without distinction of class, of any desire to own private property or to pursue any private purposes. . . . People’s courts, set up by the visiting teams of cadres and conducted with similar cowardly hysteria to those of China, demanded quotas of denunciations by the villagers and ordered on-the-spot destruction of property and execution of the owners by various unjudicial barbarities; besides tens of thousands who lost their lives many more were made outcasts from their village communities. . . .”


“Hard times lay ahead for the people of North Viet-Nam (late 1954). . . . Colonialism was dead but misery and unfreedom continued to be the people’s lot. . . . And in the political conflicts that these conditions were bound to produce, terror would still remain the government’s chief weapon against popular discontent.”

South Viet-Nam—A Partial Chronology

February 2, 1960—Terrorists sack and burn the Buddhist temple at Phuoc Thanh, Tay Ninh province. They stab to death 17-year old Phan Van Ngoc, who tries to stop them.

April 22, 1960—Some 30 armed communists raid Thoi Long, An Xuyen province. They attempt to take away villager Cao Van Nanh, 45. Villagers protest en masse. Farmer Pham Van Bai, 56, is particularly argumentative. The communists, angered, seize him. This arouses the villagers who swarm toward the Viet Cong and their prisoner. The communists fire into the crowd. A 16-year old boy is shot dead.

August 23, 1960—Two school teachers, Nguyen Khoa Ngon and Miss Nguyen Thi Thiet, are preparing lessons at home when communists arrive and force them at gun point to go to their school, Rau Ran, in Phong Dinh province. There they find two men tied to the school veranda. The communists read the death order of the two men, named Canh and Van. They are executed, presumably to intimidate the school teachers.

September 24, 1960—An armed band sacks a school in An Lac, An Giang province. It piles seats and desks together and fires them and the school. All that remains is four bare walls.

September 28, 1960—Father Hoang Ngoc Minh, much beloved priest of Kontum parish, is riding from Tan Canh to Konlela. A communist road block halts his car. A bullet smashes into him. The guerrillas drive bamboo spears into Father Minh’s body, then one fires a submachine gun point blank, killing him. The driver Huynh Huu, his nephew, is seriously wounded.

September 30, 1960—A band of ten armed communists kidnap farmer Truong Van Dang, 67, from Long Tri, Long An province. They take him before what they call a “people’s tribunal.” He is condemned to death for purchasing two hectares of rice land and ignoring communist orders to turn the land over to another farmer. After the “trial” he is shot dead in his rice field.

December 6, 1960—Terrorists dynamite the kitchen at the
Saigon Golf Club, killing a Vietnamese kitchen helper and injuring two Vietnamese cooks.

December, 1960—The GVN reports to the ICC that during the year the communists destroyed or damaged 284 bridges, burned 60 medical aid stations and, through destruction of schools, deprived some 25,000 children of schooling.

March 22, 1961—A truck carrying 20 girls is dynamited on the Saigon-Vung Tau road. The girls are returning from Saigon where they have taken part in a Trung Sisters Day celebration. After the explosion terrorists open fire on survivors. Two of the girls are killed and ten wounded. The girls are unarmed and traveling without escort.

May 15, 1961—Twelve Catholic nuns from La Providence order are traveling on Highway One toward Saigon. Their bus is stopped by communists who ransack their luggage. Sister Theophile protests and is shot dead on the spot. The vehicle is sprayed with bullets seriously wounding Sister Phan Thi No. The ambush takes place near Tram Van, Tay Ninh Province.

July 26, 1961—Two Vietnamese National Assemblymen Rmah Pok and Yet Nic Bounrit, both Montagnards, are shot and killed by terrorists near Dalat. A schoolteacher, traveling with them on their visit to a Montagnard resettlement village, is also killed.

September 20, 1961—One thousand main force communist soldiers storm Phuoc Vinh, capital of (then) Phuoc Thanh province, sack and burn government buildings, behead virtually the entire administrative staff. They hold the capital for 24 hours before withdrawing.

October, 1961—A U.S. State Department study estimates that the communists are killing Vietnamese at rate of 1,500 per month.

December 13, 1961—Father Bonnet, a French parish priest from Konkala, Kontum is killed by a terrorist while visiting parishioners at Ngok Rongei.

December 20, 1961—S. Fukai, a Japanese engineer at the Da Nhim dam, a Japanese government war reparations proj-
pect to supply electric power to Viet-Nam, is kidnaped after being stopped at a road block. His fate is never learned.

**January 1, 1962**—A Vietnamese labor leader, Le Van Thieu, 63, is hacked to death by terrorists wielding machetes near Bien Hoa, in the rubber plantation on which he works.

**January 2, 1962**—Two Vietnamese technicians working in the government's anti-malaria program, Pham Van Hai and Nguyen Van Thach, are killed by communists with machetes, 12 miles south of Saigon.

**February 20, 1962**—Terrorists throw four hand grenades into a crowded village theater near Can Tho, killing 24 women and children. In all, 108 persons are killed or injured.

**April 8, 1962**—Communists execute two wounded American prisoners of war near the village of An Chau in Central Viet-Nam. Each, hands tied, is shot in the face because he cannot keep up with the retreating captors.

**May 19, 1962**—A terrorist grenade is hurled into the Aberbea restaurant in Saigon, wounding a Berlin circus manager and the cultural attaché from the German Embassy.

**May 20, 1962**—A bomb explodes in front of the Hung Dao Hotel, Saigon, a billet for American servicemen, injuring eight Vietnamese and three Americans who are in the street at the time.

**June 12, 1962**—Communists ambush a civilian passenger bus near Le Tri, An Giang province, killing the passengers, the driver and the driver's helper, a total of five men and women.

**October 20, 1962**—A teen-age communist hurls a grenade into a holiday crowd in downtown Saigon, killing six persons, including two children, and injuring 38 persons.

**November 4, 1962**—A terrorist hurls a grenade into an alley in Can Tho, killing one American serviceman and two Vietnamese children. A third Vietnamese child is seriously injured.

**January 25, 1963**—Communists dynamite a passenger-
freight train near Qui Nhon, killing eight passengers and injuring 15 others. The train is carrying only rice as freight.

March 4, 1963—Two Protestant missionaries—Elwood Forreston, an American, and Gaspart Makil, a Filipino—are shot dead at a road block between Saigon and Dalat. The Makil twin babies are shot and wounded.

March 16, 1963—Terrorists hurl a grenade into a Saigon home where an American family is having dinner, killing a French businessman and wounding four other persons, one of them a woman.

April 3, 1963—Terrorists throw two grenades into a private school near Long Xuyen, An Giang province, killing a teacher and two other adults. Students are performing their annual variety show at the time.

April 4, 1963—Terrorists throw grenades into an audience attending an outdoor motion picture showing in Cao Lanh village in the Mekong Delta, killing four persons and wounding 11.

May 23, 1963—Communists mine the main northern rail line, killing five civilian passengers. Twelve other passengers and crew are injured.

May 31, 1963—Two powerful explosions set off by terrorists on bicycles kill two Vietnamese and wound ten others in Saigon. Police believe the explosion was accidentally premature.

September 12, 1963—Miss Vo Thi Lo, 26, a schoolteacher in An Phuoc, Kien Hoa province, is found near the village with her throat cut. She had been kidnaped three days earlier.

October 16, 1963—Terrorists explode mines under two civilian buses in Kien Hoa and Quang Tin provinces, killing 18 Vietnamese and wounding 23.

November 9, 1963—Three grenades are thrown in Saigon, injuring a total of 16 persons, including four children; the first is thrown in a main street, the second along the waterfront, and the third in the Chinese residential area.

February 9, 1964—Two Americans are killed and 41
wounded, including four women and five children, when a communist bomb is set off in a sports stadium during a softball game. A second portion of the bomb fails to explode. Officials estimate that if it had, fifty persons would have died.

**February 16, 1964**—Three Americans are killed and 32 injured, most of them U.S. dependents, when terrorists bomb the Kinh Do movie theater in Saigon.

**July 14, 1964**—Pham Thao, chairman of the Catholic Action Committee in Quang Ngai, is executed when he returns to his native village of Pho Loi, Quang Ngai province.

**October, 1964**—U.S. officials in Saigon report that from January to October of 1964 the communists killed 429 Vietnamese local officials and kidnaped 482 others.

**December 24, 1964**—A Christmas eve bomb explosion at the Brink officers’ billet kills two Americans and injures 50 Americans and 13 Vietnamese.

**February 6, 1965**—Radio Liberation announces that the communists have shot two American prisoners of war as reprisals against the Vietnamese government, which had sentenced two terrorists to death.

**February 10, 1965**—Terrorists blow up an enlisted men’s barracks in Qui Nhon, killing 23 Americans.

**March 30, 1965**—A bomb explodes outside the American Embassy in Saigon, killing 2 Americans, 18 Vietnamese and injuring 100 Vietnamese and 45 Americans.

**June 24, 1965**—Radio Liberation announces the execution of an American prisoner.

**June 25, 1965**—Terrorists dynamite the My Canh restaurant in Saigon, killing 27 Vietnamese, 12 Americans, two Filipinos, one Frenchman, one German; more than 80 persons are injured.

**June, 1965**—Vietnamese officials report the rate of assassinations and kidnapings of rural officials has doubled in June over May and April; 224 officials were either killed or kidnaped.
August 18, 1965—A bomb at the Police Directorate office in Saigon kills six and wounds 15.

October 4, 1965—One of two planted bombs explodes at the Cong Hoa National Sports Stadium, killing eleven Vietnamese, including four children, and wounding 42 persons.

October 5, 1965—A bomb goes off, apparently prematurely, in a taxi on a main street in downtown Saigon, killing two Vietnamese and wounding ten others.

December 4, 1965—In Saigon a terrorist bomb kills eight persons when it explodes in front of a billet for U.S. enlisted men; 137 are injured, including 72 Americans, three New Zealanders and 62 Vietnamese.

December 12, 1965—Two terrorist platoons kill 23 Vietnamese canal construction workers asleep in a Buddhist Pagoda in Tan Huong, Dinh Tuong province; wound seven others.

December 30, 1965—Saigon editor Tu Chung of the newspaper Chinh Luan is gunned down in point blank fire as he arrives home at noon for lunch. Earlier he had published the texts of threatening notes he had received from the communists.

January 7, 1966—A Claymore mine explodes at Tan Son Nhut gate (entrance to Saigon airport), killing two persons and injuring 12.

January 17, 1966—Communists in Kien Tuong detonate a mine under a highway bus, killing 26 civilians, seven of them children. Eight persons are injured and three are listed as missing.

January 18, 1966—Communists mine a bus in Kien Tuong province, killing 26 civilians.

January 29, 1966—Terrorists kill a Catholic priest, Father Phan Khac Dau, 74, at Thanh Tri, Kien Tuong province. Five other civilians, including a church officer, are also killed. The marauders desecrate the church, destroying its statuary and religious artifacts.
February 2, 1966—A communist squad ambushes a jeep load of Vietnamese information workers, killing six and wounding one; in Hau Nghia province.

February 14, 1966—Two mines explode beneath a bus and a three-wheeled taxi on a road near Tuy Hoa, killing 48 farm laborers and injuring seven others.

March 18, 1966—Fifteen Vietnamese civilians are killed and four injured by the explosion of a homemade mine on a country road eight kilometers west of Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province.

May 22, 1966—Terrorists kill 18 sleeping men, a woman and four children during an attack on a housing center for canal workers in the Mekong Delta province of An Giang. “We are doing this to teach you a lesson,” a communist cadre is reported to have said just before he pulled the trigger.

September 10, 1966—On the eve of South Viet-Nam’s Constituent Assembly elections, communists stage 166 separate incidents of intimidation, abduction and assassination. Polling places also are destroyed.

September 11, 1966—On election day, communists kill 19 voters, wound 120, in fire on polling places, mining of roads, and in individual assassinations.

September 24, 1966—American troops free eleven persons from a communist “jail” in Phu Yen province who report that 70 fellow prisoners were deliberately starved to death and 20 others tortured until they died.

October 11, 1966—Acting on information from a 14-year old boy, allied forces discover a prison complex in Binh Dinh province containing the bodies of 12 Vietnamese who had been machine gunned and grenaded by fleeing guards.

October 22, 1966—A youth worker in Binh Chanh, Gia Dinh province, is shot and killed by raiders while asleep in his home.

October 24, 1966—The Hue-Quang Tri bus runs over a mine in Phong Dien district, Thua Thien province; 15 passengers are injured.
October 27, 1966 — A grenade is thrown into a home in Ban Me Thout, Darlac province, killing a 63-year old man and a nine-month old child; seven other persons, six of them women, are wounded.

October 28, 1966—An alert policeman arrests a female communist agent who is about to place a time-bomb under the reviewing stand at a festival in Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province.

November 1, 1966—Communists direct long-range recoilless rifle fire into downtown Saigon during National Day celebration killing or wounding 51 persons.

November 2, 1966—A grenade is thrown by a terrorist at Phu Tho racetrack, Saigon, killing two persons and wounding eight others, including two children.

November 2, 1966—A squad of armed guerrillas attacks a hamlet in Chau Thanh district, Phong Dinh province, then withdraws after detonating a 10-kilogram charge which wrecks a steel bridge across the Dau Sau canal. An aged woman and two children are wounded.

November 3, 1966—Communist squads infiltrate the outskirts of Saigon, fire 24 recoilless rifle shells on the city. Among the buildings hit are Saigon Central Market, Grall Hospital, Saigon Cathedral, a seminary chapel and several private homes. Eight persons are killed and 37 seriously wounded.

November 4, 1966—Communists lob mortar shells into a village in Hau Nghia province, killing one civilian and wounding eight.

November 4, 1966—Communist attack an outpost in Tay Ninh province, killing six civilians and wounding Revolutionary Development team members.

November 7, 1966—A communist squad on Provincial Road 8, Quang Duc province, abducts a hamlet chief and deputy chief.

November 8, 1966—In Chau Doc province, a 53-year old woman is tortured and shot to death; a note pinned to her
body accuses her of supporting the South Vietnamese government.

**November 16, 1966**—A terrorist bomb-laden bicycle on Nguyen Van Thoai Street, Saigon, explodes; two South Vietnamese soldiers and a civilian are wounded.

**November 19, 1966**—Eight mortar rounds on Can Giuoc, Long An province, kill two children; 12 civilians are wounded some 20 mortar rounds drop on Can Duoc, wounding five civilians.

**November 20, 1966**—Two policemen are wounded when they attempt to remove several communist banners equipped with explosive devices.

**November 23, 1966**—Three terrorists dressed in South Vietnamese army uniforms kill a policeman guarding a bridge at Khanh Hung (Soc Trang), Ba Xuyen province. While escaping, they throw two grenades, wounding seven civilians and two soldiers.

**November 26, 1966**—A Claymore-type mine is set off in the playground of the Trinh Hoai Duc boys' school, An Thanh, Binh Duong province. Korean troops are using adjacent area as a training site. Three Koreans are killed and a Vietnamese student is wounded.

**November 30, 1966**—Communist shell Tan Uyen market, Bien Hoa province, killing three civilians and wounding seven.

**December 4, 1966**—A village chief in Gia Dinh province is abducted from his home in Phu Lam by four men and assassinated by rifle fire.

**December 7, 1966**—Tran Van Van, Constituent Assemblyman, is assassinated while en route to the National Assembly building; death weapon is a .32 caliber East German pistol; his killers are captured.

**December 10, 1966**—A terrorist throws a grenade into the Chieu Hoi district playground, Binh Duong City, severely injuring three children.
December 10, 1966—A taxi on Highway 29, Phong Dinh province runs over a mine. Five passengers, all women, are killed and the driver badly wounded.

December 13, 1966—Revolutionary Development personnel attend a course at the Ca Mau school, An Xuyen province; a charge explodes in the classroom, killing three and wounding nine.

December 20, 1966—A squad infiltrates a hamlet in Quang Tin province, kidnaps a former Viet Cong member who recently defected, carries him to another location and shoots him.

December 27, 1966—National Constituent Assemblyman, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, narrowly escapes death when his car explodes in Gia Dinh province. A charge is concealed beneath the vehicle and detonates as Dr. Dan opens the door. Dan escapes with minor wounds but a woman passerby is killed and five civilians wounded.

January 6, 1967—A South Vietnamese policeman in Tan Chu, Kien Phong province, is shot and killed while members of his family look on.

January 7, 1967—An explosion destroys a school and health station in Hong Ngu district, Kien Phong province.

January 8, 1967—in An Xuyen province, terrorists throw a grenade into the house of a hamlet chief. One of the children is killed and three other civilians are wounded.

January 12, 1967—Three civilians are killed and three South Vietnamese soldiers are wounded in an ambush of a truck on National Highway 14, two kilometers south of Tan Canh village.

January 15, 1967—At Thanh Tho, Quang Tin province, communists shoot a merchant when he refuses to give them two oxen.

January 21, 1967—Several communists force their way into Buon Ho, Darlac province, gather the people for a propaganda lecture; kidnap six young men.
February 6, 1967—Communists raid Lieu Tri, Quang Tin province, and abduct a teacher and a local official. The teacher is killed.

February 6, 1967—A grenade is thrown onto the porch where Kontum deputy province chief is entertaining a group of South Vietnamese officials. The provincial Chief of Education is killed instantly; the Chief of Montagnard Affairs and another official die of wounds the next day. Eight others are seriously wounded.

March 4, 1967—Only two badly wounded prisoners survive as communist prison guards near Can Tho tie 12 South Vietnamese captives together, shoot and stab them before fleeing from advancing South Vietnamese troops; both survivors live despite having their throats cut.

March 5, 1967—In an nocturnal raid, terrorists murder two young Revolutionary Development workers in Vinh Phu, Phu Yen province. Seven additional Revolutionary Development team members are killed in the ensuing gunfight and four are wounded. The raid is the 113th attack on Revolutionary Development workers since the first of the year.

March 30, 1967—Recoilless rifle fire directed at homes of families of South Vietnamese troops demolishes 200 houses and kills 32 men, women and children in the capital city of Bac Lieu province.

April 13, 1967—A South Vietnamese entertainment troupe is the target of nocturnal raid in Lu Song hamlet, near Da Nang. The team chief and his deputy are killed; two team members are wounded.

April 14, 1967—Terrorists kidnap Nguyen Van Son in Binh Chanh district, Gia Dinh province; he is a candidate in the elections for village council.

April 16, 1967—A squad enters Cam Ha, Quang Nam province and murders an election candidate. One child is killed and three civilians are wounded.

April 18, 1967—Sui Chon hamlet northeast of Saigon is attacked by assassins and arsonists who slay five Revolutionary Development team members, wound three, abduct seven;
three of those slain are young girls, whose hands are tied behind their backs before they are shot in the head. One-third of the hamlet's dwelling is destroyed by fire.

April 26, 1967—Nguyen Cam, chief of Ba Dan hamlet, Quang Nam province, is shot and killed by a terrorist. Cam had been a candidate in recent elections.

May 10, 1967—A bus loaded with South Vietnamese civilians runs over a land mine near Than Bach Thach, Phu Bon province. One passenger is killed; the driver and five passengers are wounded.

May 11, 1967—More than 200 doctors and medical workers of the Republic of South Viet-Nam have been victims of the communists in the past 10 years, State Health Secretary Dr. Tran Van Lu-Y tells the World Health Organization in Geneva. He says 211 members of his staff have been killed or kidnapped; 174 dispensaries, maternity homes and hospitals destroyed; 40 ambulances mined or machine-gunned.

May 16, 1967—in two separate attacks in Quang Tin and Quang Tri provinces, communists kill eight Revolutionary Development team members and injure five.

May 24, 1967—The information officer of Phu Thanh, Bien Hoa province, and his two children are killed by grenades thrown into their home at 3 a.m.

May 29, 1967—Frogmen emerge from the Perfume River in Hue to blow up a hotel housing members of the International Control Commission. No member of the Indian-Canadian-Polish team is hurt, but five South Vietnamese civilians are killed and 15 wounded. The hotel is 80 percent destroyed.

June 2, 1967—Armed with automatic weapons, two Platoons make a post-midnight raid on a Chieu Hoi camp in Long An. They injure five South Vietnamese soldiers and five civilians.

June 27, 1967—Twenty-three civilians are killed when their bus strikes a mine in Binh Duong province, southeast of Lai Khe.
**July 6, 1967**—Several children walking on the road to a pagoda at Cam Pho hamlet, Quang Nam province, are wounded when a passing truck explodes a Viet-Cong anti-tank mine. One child dies of wounds.

**July 13, 1967**—An explosion in a Hue restaurant kills two Vietnamese. Twelve Vietnamese, seven Americans and one Filipino are injured.

**July 14, 1967**—Terrorists dressed in Vietnamese Army uniforms capture a prison in Quang Nam province, releasing about 1,000 of the 1,200 inmates; they execute 80 in the prison yard. Ten civilians are killed and 29 wounded as the terrorists fight their way out of the area.

**July 25, 1967**—Communists appear at homes in Binh Trieu, Long An province and kidnap four men, a woman and the woman’s 16-year-old son. All six are found the following morning along Highway 13, hands tied behind their backs, a bullet in each head.

**August 5, 1967**—During a special civics class in a secondary school in An Xuyen province, part of the September election “get out the vote” campaign, a terrorist gives a small girl a hand grenade with the pin extracted and tells her to carry it carefully to her teacher. At the classroom door the child drops the grenade, killing herself and injuring nine children.

**August 24, 1967**—Terrorists kill one and wound four when they detonate a charge at the home of a Vietnamese policeman in Can Tho, Phong Dinh province.

**August 26, 1967**—Twenty-two civilians die and six are injured when their bus strikes a mine in Kien Hoa province.

**August 27, 1967**—A week before presidential and senate elections, terrorists step up their activities. A recoilless rifle and mortar attack on Can Tho kills 46 and injures 227. Ten die and ten are injured in an attack on a Revolutionary Development team in Phuoc Long province. Fourteen civilians, including five children, are wounded by mortar fire southeast of Ban Me Thuot, Darlac province. Two civilians die and one is wounded in an attack on a hamlet in Binh
Long province. Six civilians are kidnapped from Phuoc Hung village in Thua Thien province.

**August 29, 1967**—Groups of communists infiltrate four hamlets in Thanh Binh district, Quang Nam province, kill two civilians and abduct six, including an inter-family chief.

**September 1, 1967**—Terrorist explosives blast six craters in National Route 4 in Dinh Tuong province, stopping all vehicular traffic except a South Vietnamese army ambulance bus which runs over a pressure mine, killing 13 passengers, injuring 23.

**September 3, 1967**—Shortly after polls open in Tuy Hoa, Phu Yen province, communists detonate a bomb hidden in a polling place. Three voters are killed and 42 are wounded. Election morning attacks, including long-range shellings, claim 48 lives.

**November 8, 1967**—The Ky Chanh refugee center in Quang Tin province is infiltrated by terrorists who kill four persons, wound nine others and kidnap nine more; they also fire the camp's school.

**December 5, 1967**—A name that should be remembered as long as Lidice is Dak Son, a Montagnard village of some 2,000 in Phuoc Long province, the scene of what in some ways remains the worst atrocity in the entire atrocity-ridden war. Some 300 communists stage a reprisal raid on Dak Son. The chief weapon: the flame thrower, 60 of them. The purpose: purely to terrorize. The result: a Carthaginian solution, all but sowing of the salt. After breaking through the flimsy hamlet militia defense, the communists set about systematically to destroy the village and the people in it. Families are incinerated alive in their grass-roofed huts or in the shelters dug beneath their beds. Everything combustible is put to the torch: houses, recently harvested grain on the ground, livestock, fences, trees, people. One of the first Americans to approach the scene the following day: "As we approached the place I thought I saw charred cordwood piled up the way you pile up logs neatly beside the road. When we got closer I could see it was burned bodies of several dozen babies. The odor of burned flesh, which really is an unforgettable smell, reached us outside the village and of course got stronger at the center. People were trying to
breathe through cabbage leaves... "I saw a small boy a
smaller girl, probably his sister, sort of melted together in a
charred embrace. I saw a mother burned black still hiding
two children, also burned black. Everything was burned and
black. The worst was the wail of the survivors who were pick-
ing through the smouldering ruins. One man kept screaming
and screaming at the top of his lungs. For an hour he kept it
up. He wasn't hurt that I could tell. He just kept screaming
until a doctor gave him a shot of morphine or something.

Fire blocs bodies I learned, and after a few hours the
skin splits and peels and curls. The far end of the village
wasn't burned; the communists ran out of flamethrower fuel
before they got to it. . . . " Estimated toll: 252 dead, about
two-thirds of them women and children; 200 abducted, never
to return.

December 14, 1967—Bui Quang San, member of South
Viet-Nam's lower house, is gunned down in his home near
Saigon. Two days before his murder, San told friends of
receiving a letter from the communists threatening his life.
His mother, first wife and six children were killed in an
earlier Viet Cong raid in the city of Hoi An.

December 14, 1967—Saigon reports a total of 232 civilians
killed by acts of terrorism in one week.

December 16, 1967—During the intermission at a classical
drama at the University of Saigon, a communist appears on
stage and begins a propaganda speech about the NLF. A
student attempts to climb to the stage and is shot in the
stomach. Two other students are shot in the melee that
follows.

January 20, 1968—An armed propaganda team enters Tam
Quan, Binh Dinh province, gathers 100 people for a pro-
paganda session; one prominent village elder objects and is
shot to death.

April 6, 1968—A band of communists enters That Vinh
Dong, Tay Ninh province; they sell several thousand piasters
worth of "war bonds" and then depart, taking with them a
school teacher, the hamlet chief's two daughters and nephew
and six other males age 15 or 16.

May 5-June 22, 1968—Some 417 rockets are fired indis-
criminately into Saigon, chiefly in the densely-populated
Fourth District. The rockets are 107mm Chinese-made and 122mm Soviet-made. Result: 115 dead, 528 hospitalized.

May 29, 1968—A band of communists stops all traffic on Route 155 in Vinh Binh province; 50 civilians are kidnaped, including a Protestant minister; 2 buses and 28 three-wheeled taxis are burned.

June 28, 1968—A major attack is made against the refugee center and fishing village of Son Tra, south of Da Nang. In all, 88 persons are killed and 103 are wounded by mortar and machine gun fire, grenades and explosive charges. Some 450 homes are destroyed leaving 3,000 of the 5,000 persons there homeless. Later, villagers gathering bamboo to rebuild the center are fired on from ambush.

July 28, 1968—Four gun-wielding terrorists, two of them women, detonate a 60-pound plastique charge in city room of Cholon Daily News, most prominent of city's seven Chinese-language newspapers, after ordering workers out of building; the four escape before police arrive.

September 1, 1968—Doctors at the American Division's 27th Surgical Hospital report two Montagnard women have been brought in for treatment for advanced anemia. It is determined that the North Vietnamese had been systematically draining them of blood for treating their own wounded.

September 12, 1968—A communist report (captured in Binh Duong province) from the Chau Thanh district Security Section to the provincial Party Central Committee says that seven prisoners in the district's custody were shot prior to an expected enemy sweep operation: "we killed them to make possible our safe escape," the report says.

September 26, 1968—A grenade is thrown into the crowded Saigon central market, killing one person and wounding 11.

December 11, 1968—A band of terrorists appears at the home of the provincial People's Self-Defense Force chief in Tri Ton, Chau Doc province; they bind his arms with rope and lead him 50 yards from his home where they fire a burst from a submachine gun into his body.

January 6, 1969—The Vietnamese Minister of Education, Dr. Le Minh Tri, is killed when two terrorists on a motor-
cycle hurl a hand grenade through the window of the car in which he is riding.

February 7, 1969—A satchel charge is exploded in the Can Tho market place, killing one and wounding three.

February 16, 1969—Communists invade and occupy Phuoc My village, Quang Tin province, for several days. Later, survivors describe a series of brutal acts: a 78-year old villager shot for refusing to cut down a tree for a fortification; a 73-year old man killed when he could not or would not leave his home, pleading that infirmities prevented him from walking; an 11-year old boy stabbed; several families grenaded in their homes.

January 19, 1969—A bicycle bomb explodes in a shop in Kien Hoa province (Truc Giang), killing six civilians and wounding 16.

February 24, 1969—Terrorists enter the Catholic Church in Quang Ngai province, assassinate the priest and an altar boy.

February 26, 1969—A bicycle bomb explodes near a pool hall in Kien Hoa province, killing a child and wounding three other persons.

March 4, 1969—Rector of Saigon University, Professor Tran Anh, is shot by motorcycle-riding terrorists; previously he had been notified that he was on the “death list” of something called the “Suicide Regiment of the Saigon Youth Guard.”

March 5, 1969—An attempt is made to assassinate Prime Minister Tran Van Huong by hurling a satchel charge against the automobile in which he is riding. The attempt fails and most of the terrorists are captured.

March 6, 1969—An explosive charge explodes next to a wall at Quang Ngai city hospital, killing a maternity patient and destroying two ambulances.

March 9, 1969—Terrorists enter Xom Lang, Go Cong province, take Mrs. Phan Thi Tri from her home to a nearby rice field where they behead her, explaining that her husband had defected from the communists.
March 9, 1969—A band of communists attack Loc An, Loc My and Loc Hung villages in Quang Nam province, killing two adults and kidnapping ten teenage boys.

March 13, 1969—Kon Sitiu and Kon Bobanh, two Montagnard villages in Kontum province, are raided by terrorists; 15 persons killed; 23 kidnaped, two of whom are later executed; three long-houses, a church and a school burned. A hamlet chief is beaten to death. Survivors say the communists' explanation is: "We are teaching you not to cooperate with the government."

March 21, 1969—A Kontum province refugee center is attacked for the second time by a PAVN battalion using mortars and B-40 rockets. Seventeen civilians are killed and 36 wounded, many of them women and children. A third of the center is destroyed.

April 4, 1969—A pagoda in Quang Nam province is dynamited, killing four persons, wounding 14.

April 9, 1969—Terrorists attack the Phu Binh refugee center, Quang Ngai province and fire 70 houses, leaving 200 homeless. Four persons are kidnaped.

April 11, 1969—A satchel charge explodes in the Dinh Thanh temple, Long Thanh village, Phong Dinh province, wounding four children.

April 15, 1969—An armed propaganda team invades An Ky refugee center, Quang Ngai province, and attempts to force out the people living there; nine are killed and ten others wounded.

April 16, 1969—The Hoa Dai refugee center in Binh Dinh province is invaded by an armed propaganda team. The refugees are urged to return to their former (communist dominated) village, but refuse; the communists burn 146 houses.

April 19, 1969—Hieu Duc district refugee center, Quang Nam province, is invaded and ten persons kidnaped.

April 23, 1969—Son Tinh district refugee center, Quang Ngai province, is invaded; two women are shot and 10 persons kidnaped.
May 6, 1969—Le Van Gio, 37, is kidnaped and later shot for refusing to pay “taxes” to a communist agent who entered his village of Vinh Phu, An Giang province.

May 8, 1969—Communist sappers detonate a charge outside the Postal-Telephone Building in Saigon’s Kennedy Square, killing four civilians and wounding 19.

May 10, 1969—Sappers explode a charge of plastique in Duong Hong, Quang Nam province, killing eight civilians and wounding four.

May 12, 1969—A communist sapper squad attacks Phu My, Binh Dinh province, with satchel charges, rockets and grenades; 10 civilians are killed, 19 wounded; 87 homes are destroyed.

May 14, 1969—Five communist 122mm rockets land in the residential area of Da Nang, killing five civilians and wounding 18.

June 18, 1969—Three children are wounded when they step on a communist mine while playing near their home in Quan Long (Ca Mau) city, An Xuyen province.

June 19, 1969—In Phu My, Thua Thien province, communists assassinate a 54-year old man and his 70-year old mother.

June 24, 1969—A 122mm communists rocket strikes the Thanh Tam hospital in Ho Nai, Bien Hoa province, killing one patient.

June 30, 1969—Communist mortar shells destroy the Phuoc Long pagoda in Chanh Hiep, Binh Duong province; one Buddhist monk is killed and ten persons wounded.

June 30, 1969—Three members of the People’s Self-Defense Force are kidnaped from Phu My, Bien Hoa province.

July 2, 1969—Two communist assassins enter a hamlet office in Thai Phu, Tay Ninh province, shoot and wound the hamlet chief and his deputy.
July 17, 1969—A grenade is thrown into Cho Con market, Da Nang, wounding 13 civilians, most of them women.

July 19, 1969—A communist unit attacks the Chieu Hoi center in Vinh Binh province killing five persons, including two women and a youth, and wounding 11 civilians.

July 18, 1969—Police report two incidents of B-40 rockets being fired into trucks on the highway, one in Quang Duc province in which three civilians were wounded and one in Darlac province which killed the driver.

July 19, 1969—Communist seize and shoot Luong Van Thanh, a People’s Self-Defense Force member, Tan Hoi Dong, Dinh Tuong province.

July 30, 1969—Communists rocket the refugee center of Hung My, Binh Duong, wounding 76 persons.

August 1, 1969—A sapper team detonates a plastique charge at the base of an electric transformer tower in Saigon, cutting the line.

August 5, 1969—Two grenades are thrown into the elementary school in Vinh Chau, Quang Nam province, where a school board meeting is taking place. Five persons are killed and 21 are wounded.

August 7, 1969—Communist sappers set off some 30 separate plastique charges in the U.S. Sixth Evacuation Hospital compound, Cam Ranh Bay, killing two and wounding 57 patients.

August 7, 1969—A series of explosions is detonated outside an adult education school for Vietnamese military in Cholon, killing eight and wounding 60.

August 13, 1969—Officials in Saigon report a total of 17 communist terror attacks on refugee centers in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 28 persons dead, 75 injured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged.

August 21, 1969—Communists infiltrate Ho Phong, Bac Lieu province, and kill three People’s Self-Defense Force members, wound two others.
August 26, 1969—A nine-month-old baby in his mother's arms is shot in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat, Quang Nam province; also found dead are three children between ages six and ten, an elderly man, a middle-aged man and a middle-aged woman, a total of seven, all shot at least once in the back of the head.

September 6, 1969—Communists rocket and mortar the training center of the National Police Field Force in Dalat, killing five trainees and wounding 26.

September 9, 1969—South Vietnamese officials report that nearly 5,000 South Vietnamese civilians have been killed by communist terror during 1969.

September 20, 1969—Communists attack Tu Van refugee center in Quang Ngai province, killing 8 persons and wounding two, all families of local People's Self-Defense Force members. In nearby Binh Son, eight members of a police official's family are killed.

September 24, 1969—A bus hits a mine on Highway 1, north of Duc Tho, Quang Ngai province; 12 passengers are killed.

October 13, 1969—A grenade is thrown in the Vi Thanh City Chieu Hoi center, killing three civilians and wounding 46; about half those wounded are dependents.

October 13, 1969—Communists kidnap a Catholic priest and a lay assistant from the church at Phu Hoi, Bien Hoa province.

October 27, 1969—Communists booby trap the body of a People's Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed. When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent explosion kills four of them.
Statistics (See Chart Below)

In May, 1967 the GVN-U.S. began employing new and more sophisticated systems, some using computers, for the collection and analysis of statistical data, including data on terror incidents. Under the new systems, categories were changed some what and therefore the pre-1967 figures below are not strictly comparable to those later (hence the drop in total number of terror acts for 1968 and first ten months of 1969).

With respect to the general matter of the Viet-Nam war and statistics, experienced writers in the mass media, the academic community and in government have learned, often from personal and bitter experience, not to try to quantify the Viet-Nam war. As a result they reflexively eschew statistics, not because they do not recognize them as a valuable tool, but because they know the conditions and circumstances under which they are collected make them at best, untrustworthy, and at worst, dangerously misleading. With respect to terror acts, the data processing system is chiefly dependent on reports from the 2500-village countryside, a shaky base indeed.

Like most people in developing societies the Vietnamese are not great record keepers and particularly are not keepers of precise numbers, usually seeing no need. (Belief in the imperative need for figures, indeed simply to become statistics-conscious, seems to be a characteristic that develops as does the society.) Beyond this unperceived need to collect statistics of any sort, including those on terror, there is in Viet-Nam a fog of war which by its disruptive nature virtually prohibits systematic and patient collection of data. War is often responsible for the destruction of such data as has been assembled. This is the case, for example, of records of land surveys, title deeds and other legal documents on holdings in the Mekong Delta, a jurist's nightmare, one which the courts will be sorting out for a generation.

Thus in Viet-Nam there is the triple problem of indifference to the collection of statistics, inability because of war to collect them, and incomplete reporting even when collected. Therefore this chart is to be treated cautiously. Its benefit, if any, is simply to suggest the scope and general order of magnitude of communist terror acts over the years; the error probably is not more than plus or minus 25 percent.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Terror Acts¹</th>
<th>Assassinations²</th>
<th>Kidnapings³</th>
<th>Attacks⁴</th>
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<td>2,000 (est.)</td>
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(7 mos.)

This table was updated as the manuscript was going to print and covers the period through July 1970.

1. Includes sabotage, harassing fire, visits by armed propaganda teams to villages, “VC War Bond” sales, confiscation of food, but not the other acts of terror listed in subsequent columns.

2. Until May 1967 the figures are for assassinations of government officials only, and not killings of other civilians (records were kept only on officials and even these are incomplete.) Based on a 1964 study it probably is safe to conclude that for every official Vietnamese assassinated, at least four non-officials were killed.

3. As in the case of assassinations, the only records of kidnapings kept prior to May 1967 were kidnapings of government officials; in light of a 1964 study, it is safe to conclude that for every government official kidnaped, two non-government persons were seized. The GVN reported to the ICC in 1966 these kidnaping figures (government and non-government) totaled: 1962, 10,000; 1963, 7,200; 1964, 10,450; 1965, 11,500.
Glossary of Vietnamese Terms

The term Viet Cong used to describe the communist forces in Viet-Nam is an imprecise one. Nevertheless it now is in almost universal use. The correct terms for the specific forces on the other side are as follow:

A. The National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam (NLFSV), generally called the National Liberation Front (NLF), sometimes NFLSVN. This is a communist front organization which is the major—in terms of numbers—enemy force. It is headed by a Central Committee and has elements running down to the villages. It is made up of some 20 ostensibly independent functional organizations, and a total membership of from 200,000 to 300,000, with perhaps 30,000 full-time cadres, about half of whom are Northerners.

B. People's Liberation Armed Force (PLAF), formerly called the National Liberation Front Army or Liberation Army. It is divided into two parts:
   1. The Full Military Force, usually called the Main Force or "hard hats".
   2. The Para-Military Force, or the guerrilla force which in turn is of two types.
      a. Regional or Territorial Units—bands of guerrillas living in the mangrove swamps and other remote areas.
      b. The Local Guerrilla—the part-time fighter who is a farmer by day and a guerrilla by night.

C. The Communist Party of South Viet-Nam, known in the South as the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP); its junior organization is the People's Revolutionary Party Youth League (PRPYL).

4. Military attacks on villages ambushes, etc., by the Liberation Army. After the beginning of the big-unit war and the arrival of large numbers of PAVN, this figure no longer made any sense.

5. The collection system broke down during the 1968 Tet offensive and no firm statistics on terror acts are available for the period Feb. 1 - March 15. The GVN reported civilian casualties at Tet as 7,424 killed and 15,434 wounded.
D. People's Army of Viet-Nam (PAVN), soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army serving in the South, number currently 105,000 (known in NVN, as Vietnam People's Army).

Other major terms used in Viet-Nam follow:

ARVN—Army of (South) Viet-Nam.

Big-Unit War—The war so far fought chiefly in the highlands and along the 17th parallel that separates North from South Viet-Nam.

Binh Van—The NLF troop proselyting program; literally, action among the enemy troops.

Cao Dai—Religious sect unique to Viet-Nam; a blend of all major world religions; claims membership of one million.

Chieu Hoi—The GVN's surrender or amnesty program; usually called in English the open arms program.

CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Groups—Guerrilla-type units of the GVN.

Civil Guard—Early GVN para-military organization, now called Regional Forces.

CORDS—Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support; the U.S. element supporting the "pacification" program in terms of logistics and advice.

COSVN—Central Office for South Viet-Nam. Communist Operational headquarters in the South.

Dang Lao Dong—Workers Party, the Communist Party of North Viet-Nam.

Dau Tranh—Literally, struggle; the golden word in the communist lexicon. Essentially a series of social disorders in rural areas designed chiefly to raise revolutionary consciousness among villagers and lead to the General Uprising.

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone—The three-mile wide zone along the 17th parallel separating North from South Viet-Nam.

Doan Ket—(See National Reconciliation)
**DRV**—Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, i.e., North Viet-Nam.

**Dong**—Vietnamese unit of money, usually termed “plaster” by foreigners.

**First, Second and Third Stages**—The three phases of revolutionary guerrilla war as outlined by:

Mao: 1) The enemy’s strategic offensive and our strategic defensive.
2) The enemy’s strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive.
3) Our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat.

Truong Chinh: 1) Defensive
2) Equilibrium of forces
3) General counter-offensive.

Giap: 1) Contention (consisting of “many years of more and more intense and generalized guerrilla fighting”)
2) Equilibrium
3) Counter-offensive (“first by a series of local operations, then by others on a larger scale, which were to lead to the decisive victory of Dien Bien Phu”)

**GVN**—Government of (South) Viet-Nam.

**General Uprising (Tong Khoi Nghia)**—Major social myth of the Vietnamese communists, similar to the early communist social myth of the general strike. Also used is noi day dong loat, which means essentially the same thing.

**Hoa Hao**—Religious sect unique to South Viet-Nam; a Buddhist variant differing chiefly from other Buddhist sects in its militancy.

**Hoi Chanh**—Term for a person who comes in under the GVN Chieu Hoi or National Reconciliation program.

**ICC or ICSC**—The International Control Commission or the International Control and Surveillance Commission—the in-
ternational organization (Canada, India, Poland) created to supervise the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Accords in Indochina.

*Kiem Thao*—Communist institution: criticism and self-criticism sessions.

*Liberation Army*—(See above)

*National Reconciliation*—The broad GVN amnesty program. In Vietnamese, *Dai Dvon Ket*.

*NLF, NLFSV, NLFSVN, NFLSVN*—(See above)

*Pacification*—(See National Reconciliation and Revolutionary Development)

*PAVN*—(See D above)

*PAFF*—Police Field Force; GVN.

*PLAF*—(See B above)

*PSDF*—People’s Self Defense Force. The static home-guard militia in the Vietnamese villages; in effect the lowest echelon of the GVN’s defense structure.

*Popular Forces (PF)*—GVN’s district level para-military force, formerly called Self-Defense Force (Dan Ve).

*PRP*—(See C above)

*PRP Youth League*—(See C above)

*Protracted Conflict*—Communist doctrinal thesis, highly deterministic, which holds that time, especially in terms of decades, is on the side of the communists; military equivalent to communist political concept of communism as the wave of the future.

*Revolutionary Development*—Name for GVN “pacification” program designed to improve at a highly accelerated rate the socio-economic-political lot of the SVN countryside.

*Regional Force (RF)*—GVN’s para-military force standing
between ARVN as a national army and the Popular Force; found at province level.

Resistance (The)—Communist name for the French-Viet Minh War, 1946-54.

RGW—Revolutionary Guerrilla War; type of war being fought in Viet-Nam. (See First, Second, Third stages).

RVNAF—Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces (South Vietnamese armed forces).

Self-Defense Force—Former name of GVN village militia.

Special War—Name used by the communists for the type of war being fought in South Viet-Nam. They define it as an imperialist war for the purpose of colonization but in which the fighting is done by “comprador natives” or “lackeys” rather than by soldiers of the colonizing nation.

Strategic Hamlet—Diem government’s program to develop a system of defended villages as part of its resources control program. After Diem, it became known as the New Life Hamlet. Elements were later incorporated in Revolutionary Development Program.

Struggle Movement—See Dau Tranh

Tong Khoi Nghia—See General Uprising

Viet Cong—Imprecise but now universally employed term for the communist forces in South Viet-Nam.

VNAF—(South) Viet-Nam Air Force.

INDEX TO MAP OF HUE INDICATING MAJOR BODY FINDS

First Finds (Total 19 sites; the major ones are):
1—Gia Hoi High School
2—Tang Quang Tu Pagoda
3—Bai Dau (Con Mo)
4—Cho Thong
5—Imperial Tombs (Tu Duc, Dong Khanh)
6—Thien Ham
7—Dong Gi
Second Finds
8—Phu Thu (Sand Dune Find)
   a—Vinh Luu
   b—Le Xa Dong
   c—Xuan O
9—Xuan Hoa — Van Duong
10—Le Xa Tay
11—Vinh Loc District
12—Nam Hoa District

Third Find
13—Dai Mai Creek (Nam Hoa District)

Fourth Finds
14—Phu Thu (Salt Flat Find)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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He has worked as a journalist in the United States and Asia, and for the United Nations as a civilian during the Korean war. He has been an officer of the United States Information Agency since 1958 when he covered the White House for the Voice of America. Subsequent assignments have taken him to Viet-Nam and to Tokyo where he is currently serving as the Special Assistant for Political Military Affairs to the director of the United States Information Service in Japan.