

## RESUPPLY FROM OUT OF COUNTRY

The key to the success of the enemy war effort was to satisfy the increasing demands for war materials and personnel to support the enemy objectives in the south. The enemy in the Mekong Delta of SVN depended heavily on infiltration of weapons and ammunition from NVN.

As early as 1960, evidence began accumulating on infiltration routes used by the enemy. Several options were available: direct seaborne infiltration; Cambodia (through Sihanoukville, Kampot, or Kep, then overland through Cambodia); and the overland route through Laos.

### Seaborne Infiltration

Seaborne infiltration of material and selected cadre into SVN probably started in the late 1950s. By 1962 (and possibly as early as 1960), the North Vietnamese were operating a maritime infiltration group that used ocean-going trawlers to transport munitions and some key personnel into SVN. Before 1963, the enemy used a variety of units ranging from small cargo junks to ships with a capacity of 100 tons. During this period, the enemy also relied on captured material and buried caches from earlier clashes with the French.

DIA believes that maritime infiltration reached its highest level in 1964 and early 1965. VC defectors had reported many seaborne deliveries from NVN to SVN. A CinCPac/CinCPacFlt study in 1967 concluded there had been as many as 20 trawler infiltrations in 1963, 15 in 1964, and perhaps 6 or 7 in 1965. NavForV estimated that these trawlers carried as much as 4,200 tons of arms and ammunition into SVN, enough to support 25 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions for one year. The destinations of the early trawlers were probably An Xuyen or Kien Hoa Provinces in IV Corps.

Prompted by the discovery of an enemy trawler that had infiltrated II Corps, the U.S. Navy and the VNN initiated a coastal surveillance operation, Market Time, in March 1965. Because of the buildup of Market Time forces in 1965 and 1966, the enemy's ability to resupply his forces by seaborne infiltration decreased drastically. MACV estimated in 1965 that about 70 percent of VC/NVA resupply was accomplished by maritime infiltration. By mid-1966, MACV determined that not more than 10 percent of VC/NVA logistic support came by sea. By the end of 1966, MACV was able to say that there was no credible evidence of any significant infiltration of enemy troops or supplies by sea since November 1965.

During the first 3 years of Market Time, 12 NVN trawlers were detected heading for I, II, and IV Corps. III Corps was not used as a termination point because it failed to meet the security requirements of a sheltered, enemy-controlled beach. In early 1966,

in-country movement revealed that supplies destined for III Corps were probably landed in IV Corps, where facilities for receiving the cargo had been set up.

The nature of the trawler infiltration attempts during the first 3 years of Market Time suggested that the enemy would attempt seaborne infiltration to solve a short-term crisis. Trawlers were not inclined to abort their missions, and 8 of 12 trawlers were destroyed. The most drastic seaborne resupply attempt occurred immediately after the heaviest fighting of the Tet offensive in February 1968. During late February, 5 trawlers were detected attempting infiltration; this was the first time Market Time forces had observed an enemy attempt to saturate the coastal surveillance barriers. One trawler aborted its mission before entering SVN's contiguous waters. Several days later, 4 trawlers came under Market Time surveillance as they approached the coast of SVN off I, II, and IV Corps. Three of the trawlers were destroyed and the fourth aborted its mission. One of the trawlers carried a large quantity of medical supplies. This infiltration attempt had obviously been crisis-oriented in reaction to enemy casualties during Tet.

#### Infiltration from Cambodia through Sihanoukville

Cambodia played an increasingly important role in the resupply of war material to the VC in SVN (figure A-1). Official U.S. acceptance of Cambodia's role did not come until 1970, however, because of political implications.


CAS<sup>1</sup> reporting from Phnom Penh through the late 1950s reflected the evolution of an NVA-directed VC infrastructure in the Cambodian sanctuary. The enemy mission was to penetrate the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy and establish a base of support. War Zone D, the Parrot's Beak, and then War Zone C, appear successively as base areas for the VC (appendix B). By 1961-1963, the enemy established accommodations with middle-level Cambodian provincial officials along the borders of what became III and IV Corps. At the same time, supplies and funds from Phnom Penh and other urban centers were moved to these VC safe areas. There were also reports of outright logistic support of the VC by Cambodian military and civilian provincial authorities.

In January 1964, the Bucklew Report stated that Cambodia could be used for enemy infiltration into SVN. It was obvious to this study group that Cambodia offered the enemy great natural advantages -- proximity to SVN, the excellent inter-Cambodia/SVN waterway system of the Mekong-Bassac River complex, and direct access by sea. Communist-Bloc shipments could move through Sihanoukville and Kep. Had the Cambodian government been fiercely anticommunist, the enemy would not have been able to use many of these

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<sup>1</sup> CIA term for Covert American Source.

A-3



Source: MAC.

FIG. A-1: LOGISTICAL FLOW – CAMBODIA TO SVN (1966)

natural advantages with impunity. But the Cambodian government had close relationships with Hanoi, including a commercial air agreement and economic ties that permitted the stationing of key NVN economic representatives in Phnom Penh. Cambodia's foreign policy clearly showed favoritism to the communist bloc.

The VC headquarters of the "Committee for the Liberation of South Vietnam" in the early 1960s was located on the Cambodian/SVN border in Tay Ninh Province. Within Cambodia itself, North Vietnamese and Chinese elements were believed to be involved in the infiltration, with counterparts on the SVN side of the border.

The VC had taken advantage of Cambodian cooperation and would continue to do so until mid-1969. Supplies were moved by the enemy from Cambodia to SVN on inland waterways, on inland trails, or by sea in the Gulf of Thailand. There was substantial illegal trade for private profit between Cambodia and areas in SVN held by both the SVN government and the VC. Before 1963, the Mekong-Bassac River complex was the principal route from Cambodia for resupply in SVN.<sup>1</sup> Between 1963 and 1966, SVN's seizures of illegal supplies on the rivers almost ceased. Either SVN control of the border was deteriorating or the enemy had switched to land routes. By 1966, CIA had determined that VC resupply over the Cambodia/SVN border had been occurring for some time, and CIA determined the locations of many crossing points.

In 1964, a new family of Chinese communist weapons was discovered in the Delta. There were indications during late 1964 in IV Corps that VC cadre were going from main to local force units demonstrating the use of communist-bloc weapons. All-source reporting for 1964-1965 indicates massive equipping of enemy forces in III and IV Corps coinciding with shipments from Cambodian military warehouses. There were implications of high-level Cambodian military or government complicity.

It was obvious that these new weapons were being supplied from sources outside SVN. The Ho Chi Minh trail was not capable of handling this flow of material to the Delta. Although seaborne infiltration could account for the appearance of these weapons, intelligence information attests to Cambodia as their source.

In May 1965, Prince Sihanouk severed diplomatic relations with the U.S. and accepted Chinese military aid. He claimed that he was neutral. In October 1965, the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) concluded that the VC were using Cambodian territory with active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire attitude in others, and the lack of Cambodian government patrol of frontiers. USIB added that the Cambodian government stopped short of military aid.

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<sup>1</sup> Cambodian imports of potassium chlorate were very suspicious. The import of 10 metric tons in 1960 jumped to 107 metric tons for January-August 1963, far in excess of Cambodian needs.

MACV reported in 1965 that bases in Cambodia served as convenient transshipment points for supplies from NVN and China, and estimated that a minimum of 25 tons per day of all classes of supplies were entering SVN from Cambodia. In 1966, MACV concluded that, because of the increased effectiveness of Market Time and the continuation of friendly interdiction operations in Laos,

"Cambodia can figure prominently in all axes and methods except across the DMZ either as a source of supply or as a transit area for movement of enemy logistics. It is the only contiguous area and source of support for the NVA/VC forces in SVN against which no friendly military action is being taken. It could be developing into the principal transit area and source of supply for the logistical support of the NVA/VC war effort."

To substantiate this theory, NavForV was authorized to establish Sunshine Park, a program of collecting and assembling evidence to verify or deny Cambodia's role in the enemy resupply effort.

A 1966 Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), study on VC tactical use of inland waterways in SVN listed five major supply-infiltration routes from the Cambodian border area to SVN. The study noted that arms and ammunition moved from Cambodia south and east along these routes. By September, MACV's intelligence section presented a picture of the communist logistics flow within Cambodia and the destinations of supplies entering SVN from Cambodia.

At the end of 1967, the U.S. mission in Saigon noted an increase in the unconfirmed reports of shipments of communist arms and ammunition through Sihanoukville. In a 23 November message to the Secretary of State, the mission stated that: "If the enemy is to continue the war at the present levels, or expand it, a new main supply route will be required to augment present routes through the DMZ and Laos. Cambodia represents the real possibility for significant augmentation and improvement of enemy supply routes." CIA and MACV continued to reinforce this assessment.

In addition to low-level reports of Cambodia as a resupply route, communist use of Cambodia was further amplified by an examination of ordnance entering Sihanoukville on Chinese ships from October 1966 to July 1969. In spring and summer, 1969, Prince Sihanouk imposed an embargo on the delivery of communist arms and ammunition to Sihanoukville. Although the embargo was temporarily lifted, it was reimposed by late 1969. Communist use of Cambodia for distribution of supplies to SVN was halted permanently after the ouster of Sihanouk and the US/SVN cross-border operations in the spring of 1970.

Studies of goods entering Sihanoukville were made by MACV in November 1968, CinCPac in August 1969, and CIA in December 1970.<sup>1</sup> (See table A-1.)

An example of the magnitude of the supplies entering SVN from Cambodia was revealed by a communist border liaison cadre captured on 21 January 1968. The prisoner said that during the second half of 1967, 1500 tons of arms and ammunition were infiltrated from Ton Hon to the Seven Mountains and Tram Forest areas of Ha Tien District (BA 400). During the first half of 1967, 700 tons were infiltrated into this area. In April 1968, the intelligence staff at NavForV estimated that the infiltration of supplies, exclusive of food was 175 to 200 short tons per month. (The source for these figures stated that several years later it was decided that the actual infiltration tonnages were underestimated.) This infiltration rate was far greater than estimated requirements. The total monthly logistic requirement, exclusive of food, for the VC in IV Corps was about 28 short tons. Of this, 19 tons had to be infiltrated. The U.S. could not explain why infiltration exceeded the total requirements by such a large proportion. The VC tended to cache supplies, and U.S./SVN operations had uncovered many of these. Another factor may have been that infiltration depended on Cambodian cooperation; thus, it was important that the VC infiltrate as rapidly as possible, while the Cambodian government continued its collaboration with the VC.

The arms and ammunition delivered to Sihanoukville were in excess of the Cambodian armed forces' reasonable needs for the period. It was further determined that the excess supplies would have satisfied almost two-thirds of the enemy's needs in IV, III, and southern II Corps. In all, there were between 11,000 and 19,400 tons of arms and ammunition delivered to Sihanoukville from October 1966 to July 1969 destined for the VC/NVA in SVN.

Even though evidence accumulated from the early 1960s suggested that VC were using Cambodia as an infiltration route, it was not accepted at the national level until 1970. After Prince Sihanouk was ousted from power in mid-March, documentation became available describing the role of Sihanoukville and Cambodia in ordnance resupply for the communists in SVN.

#### Overland Route through Laos (Ho Chi Minh Trail)

The overland route through Laos was always considered a possible enemy infiltration route. In 1964, MACV had evidence that the land routes from NVN through Laos handled logistical traffic at least as far south as southern II Corps.

The Ho Chi Minh trail was upgraded to a truck route in 1964. When the new family of arms was discovered in the Delta, the trail was still under development and could not have handled the quantities of ordnance that appeared in III and IV Corps.

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<sup>1</sup> CIA's 1970 assessment was an update of earlier studies.

TABLE A-1

CHINESE DELIVERIES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION  
TO SIHANOUKVILLE -- OCTOBER 1966-JULY 1969<sup>a</sup>

Arrival date	Source in which arrival is cited <sup>b</sup>	Ship	Tonnages		
			MACV (probable)	PACOM (probable)	CIA (possible)
Oct 66	P	You Hao		250	
Dec 66	M,P,C	He Ping	450	450	1005
Jan 67	M	Hang Zou	2300		
Feb 67	C	Hang Zou			2102
Mar 67	M,P,C	He Ping	450	40	2964
Aug 67	M	Ji Ning	1000		0 <sup>c</sup>
Oct 67	M,P,C	You Yi	1400	805	1099
Dec 67	M,P	Fo Shan	10+	11	
Jan 68	M,P,C	You Yi	3348	3848	2344
Mar 68	M,P,C	Wu Xi	2000+	3000	2350
Aug 68	M,P,C	Fo Shan	2000	2000	2474
Jan 69	P,C	Li Ming		4500	2894
Mar 69	P	Huang Shi		2000	
Apr 69	C	Huang Shi			3689
Jul 69	P	You Yi			

<sup>a</sup> Cambodian Army's cut subtracted from total Chinese deliveries of arms and ammunition. CIA sets the cut at 1,679 tons with another 822 tons in legitimate aid.

<sup>b</sup> M = MACV  
P = PaCom  
C = CIA

<sup>c</sup> CIA believes the Ji Ning delivered 1,238 tons of foodstuffs and no ordnance in August 1967.

Through 1968, the enemy hardly used the overland route through Laos to resupply his forces in southern SVN. According to an Army study published in 1970, a total of 236 intelligence reports of varying reliabilities documented the flow of ordnance from Cambodia into II, III, and IV Corps from March 1967 to October 1968. Of these reports, only 14 indicated use of the overland route into Cambodia. Moreover, MACV stated in a message to JCS in December 1968 that in the Laotian panhandle below Base Area 610 (see figure B-2), the meager traffic flow recorded between December 1967 and December 1968 was considered insufficient to satisfy the needs of VC/NVA forces in southern SVN as well as those in I and II Corps.

#### IN-COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION


There is little documentation available even today describing the enemy supply system in SVN during 1965-1968. Many of the detailed maps of enemy routes that were used by NavForV during the war have been destroyed. Of the maps that survived, some are of a higher classification than this research contribution. In addition, pertinent CIA data is not readily available. The scenario presented here is based on a CinCPac Infiltration Study, NavForV and MACV in-house papers, a USIB study, and information provided by DIA.

The 1965 USIB study described the network of supply corridors used by the enemy in SVN as an interconnecting system of depots and way stations from provinces in NVN to the Ca Mau peninsula in SVN's Mekong Delta. The Tay Ninh Base Area in III Corps was thought to form the major connection between the corridors from the north and the network in the south.


A considerable part of the enemy transport system ran through VC-controlled territory. Some of this territory was controlled by the South Vietnamese during the day but not at night, when most of the enemy supplies were distributed. According to captured documents, supplies were moved in stages and handled through as many supply depots as necessary to ensure security. Transport units moved on secured routes protected by forces usually assigned from local guerrilla units. It was suspected that troops would conduct raids near the transport routes as a diversion to screen movements of supplies over more exposed sectors.

The routes generally followed the most direct waterways to base camps and enemy secret zones. Some areas, such as Kien Hoa province, offered many direct waterway routes, and the one selected certainly depended on the presence and frequency of U.S. and SVN army patrols in the area.

It is difficult to estimate the volume of supplies handled over internal VC supply routes. Figures A-2 and A-3 illustrate the possible major inland waterway routes used



**FIG. A-2: SUSPECTED IV CORPS SUPPLY ROUTES**



Before the TET offensive in 1968, in the areas of direct importance in the anticipated battle for Saigon, the military region surrounding Saigon was divided into subregions. DIA suggests this reorganization was prompted by the need for a more responsive supply system in the Capital district in view of the upcoming offensive.

**FIG. A-3: SUSPECTED III CORPS SUPPLY ROUTES**

by the VC between 1965 and 1968. It is impossible to determine when specific routes and base areas were abandoned and when they were used.

But it is possible to make some general assumptions about the nature of enemy dependence on certain routes. By 1966, the rear service groups geared to accepting those supplies that were delivered by sea had reoriented their focus to receiving supplies from Cambodia. Although the enemy probably had arms caches to be moved from his base areas on the South China Sea coast, it is likely that the traditional redistribution route from An Xuyen Province north to the lower Bassac River declined in importance after 1966. It is also probable that enemy transshipment from Cambodia to SVN in the Gulf of Thailand declined with the onset of Market Time patrols in the area.

The enemy did not have to cross the upper Mekong and Bassac Rivers, where Game Warden forces patrolled. He could supply his base areas to the north and south of the major rivers by crossing the Cambodia/SVN border by lesser waterways or overland routes on each side of the Mekong/Bassac River complex. To maintain his bases in Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh Provinces (located between major rivers), the VC would have been forced to cross major lower Delta rivers, which Game Warden patrolled. Intelligence has shown that the VC were flexible in their choice of routes to resupply their forces in southern SVN. With the vast network of waterways available to them in the Delta, they could switch their emphasis, depending on the tactical situation.

#### Distribution Organizations

A NavForV intelligence report in 1966 dealt with how the VC organization in the early 1960s received supplies by sea. Group 962 was probably the largest organization formed by the VC in IV Corps. Before becoming inactive in December 1966 when munitions began to arrive at Sihanoukville, Group 962 was responsible for receiving, distributing, and storing munitions sent to IV Corps by sea. These supplies were transshipped north into War Zones C and D.

After 1966, most infiltration into southern SVN originated from Cambodia. The distribution of war material infiltrated from Cambodia into IV Corps was apparently handled by two independent supply systems. The systems were maintained by MR-2 and -3 (VC designation) personnel. An interprovincial route served as the link between the two military regions. This route originated in the base area at the tip of An Xuyen province and went north to cross the Bassac River south of Can Tho. At the crossing, the route divided and continued until it ended in base areas north and northeast of the crossing point.

In III Corps, the enemy forces within the Saigon subregions were supported by 7 rear service groups -- subordinate to COSVN -- that were responsible for the support of all main force units operating in their area of responsibility. A deputy commander of the VC fifth front, who was captured in June 1968, said the rear service groups consolidated logistic requirements for all units operating in their areas of responsibility and submitted

the requirements to COSVN. COSVN provided the required supplies to the rear service groups quarterly. When COSVN planned operations in addition to those included in the original annual request for supplies, the rear service groups were informed of the extra supplies they would receive. The captured VC also revealed that the rear service groups generally had an abundance of munitions and experienced no trouble meeting the ammunition requirements of combat units.

## SUMMARY

Through the beginning of 1965, MACV considered the sea to be the main resupply route for the VC in southern SVN. By mid-1966, with the buildup of Market Time, MACV discounted seaborne infiltration as a major resupply method for the VC.

The overland route through Laos did not function as a resupply route for southern SVN through 1968.

Even before the major U.S. commitment in SVN in 1965, Cambodia was suspected to be playing a role in enemy resupply. There is some question as to the emphasis the communists placed on infiltration from Cambodia relative to seaborne infiltration.

By 1966, seaborne infiltration was restricted to crisis-oriented resupply attempts, and Cambodia gained in importance as the major communist resupply route to III and IV Corps. In late 1966, Chinese ships began to make deliveries destined for the VC/NVA in SVN to Sihanoukville. Between October 1966 and July 1969, these deliveries totaled between 11,000 and 19,400 tons of arms and ammunition. Until 1970, however, the U.S. did not have a complete picture of the network in Cambodia that began with the delivery of supplies to Sihanoukville and ended with their delivery over the border to forces in SVN.

Although MACV and the intelligence agencies seemed aware of these Chinese deliveries well before 1970, it was only after the ouster of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 that documentation became available to prove the relation of the Chinese deliveries and the complicity of Cambodian officials with communist resupply in SVN.

Inadequate information is available describing the enemy supply system in southern SVN from 1965 through 1968. It is clear that, by 1966, enemy rear service groups had shifted their focus from receiving supplies delivered by sea to supplies infiltrated from Cambodia.

The enemy was flexible at adapting his supply routes to the changing tactical situation. Since he could infiltrate over the Cambodian border with impunity, he had access to many lesser waterways and land routes into the Delta. The only area in which he would have been forced to cross the rivers Game Warden patrolled was in the lower Delta. Enemy base camps in Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh Provinces were located between major rivers, which the enemy would have been forced to cross to accomplish resupply.

APPENDIX B  
VC/NVA BASE AREAS AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SVN

DIA was publishing maps of communist base areas in SVN when Game Warden began. Figures B-1, B-2, and B-3 are based on DIA's maps from July 1966 through July 1968.




FIG. B-1: VC MILITARY REGIONS/WAR ZONES — 1966




FIG. B-2: VC MAJOR BASE AREAS AND WAR ZONES – 1967



APPENDIX C  
OTHER MILITARY AND QUASIMILITARY FORCES  
OPERATING IN THE DELTA AND RSSZ

## VNN RIVER FORCE

The VNN River Force assigned river craft to the River Assault Groups (RAGs) and the River Transport and Escort Group (RTEG). In January 1967, the River Force averaged 225 boats assigned, 153 available, and 129 employed. The functions of the boats included command, communications, fire support, troop lift, and escort.

### RAGs

There were 13 RAGs deployed in III and IV Corps in mid-1967. The average RAG was about 20 boats, most of which were converted LCM troop carriers. Their primary mission was combat support for ground troops. Each RAG could carry a battalion of infantry. River patrol was a secondary mission. RAGs launched a psychological campaign in the Delta, using leaflets, loudspeakers, and airdrops to publicize the Chieu Hoi program. The local populace was encouraged, often successfully, to volunteer information about the VC.

### RTEG

In mid-1967, the RTEG had 28 RAG-type craft providing armed escort for the commercial river convoys between the Delta and Saigon. About 90 percent of Saigon's supply of rice and charcoal transited in these convoys. At times, the VC controlled part of the traditional route to market (the Mang Thit-Nicholai Canal), and the RTEG was forced to convoy 100 n.mi. out of the way by an alternate route. The Mang Thit-Nicholai Canal was temporarily cleared by a joint TF 116/117 operation during the counter-offensive following Tet. In October 1968, this canal was included in the Sea Lords area of operation.

## REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES

Regional forces (RFs) at the provincial level and popular forces (PFs) at the district government level had ground forces that made sweeps through areas near rivers that had been sites of enemy firing incidents against Game Warden. In addition to ground forces, the RFs had boat companies with one company generally assigned to each province. There were 24 of these companies in 1967.

A typical RF boat company consisted of 8 vehicle and personnel landing craft (LCVP) with 30- and 50-caliber machine guns; the company carried and supported one combat-equipped company of ground troops. RF boat companies were used to maintain security of the waterways within their assigned province by patrolling, ambushes, and small-scale amphibious assaults. They were also used for point defense and routine transportation. Utilization of RF boat companies varied widely from province to province. In 1967, they were not being used effectively because of the failure of province chiefs to assign them

to productive operations and because of fragmented command, coordination, and support arrangements.

#### NATIONAL POLICE RIVER PATROL FORCE

Under the director general of the National Police, the mission of the National Police River Patrol Force was to control river and inland waterway traffic by using mobile checkpoints. This force was built around USCG-type 40-foot police river patrol boats, which tow 2 small interceptor boats. This force was not fully used until 1968. During 1967, however, there were 56 boats stationed at 4 check points.

#### VIETNAMESE CUSTOMS BOAT FLEET

This organization primarily furnished boats to district customs offices to help them in their duties. In 1967, 37 lightly armed boats were operated. The customs officials were concerned chiefly with international movement of cargo and contraband control, with emphasis on coastal ports of entry, the Mekong, and the Cambodian border. Corruption and complicity with the Cambodians were acknowledged problems within the customs service.

#### ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN)

The ARVN had 3 divisions operating in the Delta. ARVN officers generally lacked aggressiveness and motivation and VC were known to have infiltrated ARVN units.

Until 1967, the ARVN made no major efforts to disrupt the VC in the Delta. The Army was supposed to move into an area and maintain security after the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) had struck a VC unit. In fact, however, the ARVN often did not remain until pacification measures made a solid impact on the population. ARVN activities were not often coordinated with operations conducted by the MRF or Game Warden forces, and ARVN offensive operations only temporarily displaced the enemy.

In 1968, the ARVN was given the responsibility to improve and maintain security on Route 4, the vital link between the Delta and Saigon and a major VC military objective.

#### MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE

The Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), a joint Army-Navy task force, was the first U.S. force specifically targeted against VC strongholds in the Mekong Delta and RSSZ. Its primary mission was to seek out and destroy VC main force units. Troop lift was via specially designed river assault craft.

MRF consisted of 3 battalions of the Second Brigade, Ninth Infantry division, U.S. Army, and Navy River Assault Flotilla One. River Assault Flotilla One consisted of 2 river assault squadrons and one support squadron, which were made up of a mixture of armored troop carriers, monitors, command/communication boats, and assault support patrol boats. The flotilla operated from afloat bases and a shore base at Dong Tam. The Navy transported troops from the mobile base to their area of operation, then provided direct and indirect gunfire support for those operations.

While VNN RAGs had not been armored sufficiently to sustain close contact with the enemy in small waterways, MRF boats were armored well enough to allow the Force to sustain contact with the VC for several days. MRF operations began in the RSSZ in February 1967 and in the Delta in April.

Besides strike operations in reaction to intelligence on the location of enemy forces in the Delta, improved security on the vital Route 4 was a MRF goal. This would allow a resumption of normal commerce. In strike operations, assault boats moved in quickly to block all waterway escape routes for the VC; helicopters and armored transports brought in troops to establish land blocks and to seek out the enemy; and assault boats furnished naval gunfire support.

During the 1968 Tet offensive, the MRF was credited with saving the major towns and cities of the Delta, which would have been otherwise captured or destroyed by the VC. Many times after the MRF left an area, however, security was not enforced and the VC returned.

By summer 1968, the MRF was concentrating on the pacification of Long An, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa Provinces. In September, the primary focus of the MRF was the pacification of one province -- Kien Hoa.

APPENDIX D  
GAME WARDEN TASK ORGANIZATION

(SOURCE: CRR-5 INST 05400.1)


## ORGANIZATION

2101 Squadron Organization

2101.1 This Squadron is a unit of the Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PHIBPAC). Commander, Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPHIBPAC) exercises Administrative and Type Commander's control.


2101.2 The Squadron consists of five River Divisions and twenty River Sections. The Squadron Commander exercises administrative control through regularly assigned Division Commanders.

2101.3 The administrative organization is illustrated in the following schematic:



2102 Division Organization

2102.1 The River Divisions are organized as illustrated in the following schematic:




2103 River Section Organization

2103.1 Each River Section is under the control of an Officer in Charge and consists of six officers and fifty-nine enlisted men. Each River Section shall have as its normal boat allowance a total of ten boats.

2103.2 Each OINC will assign a Senior Petty Officer from the regularly assigned fifty-nine enlisted allowed to duty as training petty officer for seamanship. This petty officer will normally, but not necessarily, be selected from among the senior assigned BM, QM or GM.

2103.3 River Section boat crews are organized as illustrated in the following schematic:




2104

Tactical Operations Control

2104.1

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) has directed that this Squadron will be under the tactical operational control of Commander River Patrol Force (CTF 116) during current hostilities in Vietnam. Tactical Operational control is illustrated in the following schematic:




2104.2

CTF 116 exercises tactical operational control through his Task Group Commanders. River Division Commanders provide forces to CTF 116 or TF 116 group and unit commanders as directed.

2104.3

COMRIVRON FIVE, Division Commanders and River Section OINC's are assigned unit designations in TF 116.



**OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION  
OF  
RIVER PATROL FORCES**

On 3 January 1968, the task force organization was revised to obtain a greater responsiveness to the complex demands of the diverse elements of the force, and to enhance the capability for coordinating these elements regardless of location. Commanders of river patrol units were redesignated Task Group Commanders. Task Element Commanders were similarly upgraded to Task Unit Commanders in most cases. The task force was reorganized as follows:

<u>Task Organization</u>	<u>Operational Title</u>	<u>CDR/CO</u>
TF 116	River Patrol Force	COMRIVPATFOR
TG 116.1	Bassac River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 51
TU 116.1.0	Delta SEAL Support Unit A	OIC SEAL Team Det A Eighth Platoon
TU 116.1.1	Bassac River Patrol Unit A	OIC RIVPATSEC 511
TU 116.1.2	Bassac River Patrol Unit B	OIC RIVPATSEC 512
TU 116.1.3	Bassac River Patrol Unit C	OIC RIVPATSEC 535
TU 116.1.4	Bassac River Patrol Unit D	Not activated
TU 116.1.5	Not Assigned	
TU 116.1.6	Bassac River LST Support Unit	CO, USS JENNINGS CTY
TU 116.1.7	Not Assigned	
TU 116.1.8	Bassac River Helo Support Unit A	OIC HAL-3 DET 1
TU 116.1.9	Bassac River Helo Support Unit B	OIC HAL-3 DET 7
TG 116.2	Co Chien River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 52
TU 116.2.0	Delta SEAL Support Unit B	OIC SEAL Team Det A Sixth Platoon
TU 116.2.1	Co Chien River Patrol Unit A	OIC RIVPATSEC 513
TU 116.2.2	Co Chien River Patrol Unit B	Not Assigned
TU 116.2.3	Co Chien River Patrol Unit C	OIC RIVPATSEC 523
TU 116.2.4	Co Chien River Patrol Unit D	OIC RIVPATSEC 522
TU 116.2.5	Not Assigned	
TU 116.2.6	Co Chien River LST Support Unit	CO, USS GARRETT CTY
TU 116.2.7	Not Assigned	
TU 116.2.8	Co Chien River Helo Support Unit A	OIC HAL-3 DET 4
TU 116.2.9	Co Chien River Helo Support Unit B	OIC HAL-3 DET 3
TG 116.3	My Tho River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 53
TU 116.3.0	Delta SEAL Support Unit C	OIC SEAL Team Det A Seventh Platoon
TU 116.3.1	My Tho River Patrol Unit A	OIC RIVPATSEC 533
TU 116.3.2	My Tho River Patrol Unit B	OIC RIVPATSEC 532
TU 116.3.3	My Tho River Patrol Unit C	OIC RIVPATSEC 534
TU 116.3.4	My Tho River Patrol Unit D	OIC RIVPATSEC 531
TU 116.3.5	Not Assigned	
TU 116.3.6	My Tho River LST Support Unit	CO, USS HARNETT CTY

TU 116.3.7	Not Assigned	
TU 116.3.8	My Tho River Helo Support Unit A	OIC HAL-3 DET 5
TU 116.3.9	My Tho River Helo Support Unit B	OIC HAL-3 DET 6
TG 116.4	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Group	RSSZ Advisor
TU 116.4.0	Rung Sat Special Zone SEAL Unit	OIC SEAL Team Det G
TE 116.4.0.1	Rung Sat Special Zone Boat Support Element	OIC MST-3
TE 116.4.0.2	Rung Sat Special Zone SEAL Support Element A	OIC SEAL Team Det G ALFA Platoon
TE 116.4.0.3	Rung Sat Special Zone SEAL Support Element B	OIC SEAL Team Det G FOXTROT Platoon
TE 116.4.0.4	Rung Sat Special Zone SEAL Support Element C	OIC SEAL Team Det G BRAVO Platoon
TU 116.4.1	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Unit	COMRIVDIV 54
TE 116.4.1.1	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Element A	OIC RIVPATSEC 541
TE 116.4.1.2	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Element B	OIC RIVPATSEC 542
TE 116.4.1.3	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Element C	OIC RIVPATSEC 543
TE 116.4.1.4	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Element D	Not Activated
TU 116.4.2	Rung Sat Special Zone Minesweeping Unit	OIC MINRON 11 DET A
TU 116.4.3	Not Assigned	
TU 116.4.4	Not Assigned	
TU 116.4.5	Not Assigned	
TU 116.4.6	Rung Sat Special Zone LST Support Unit	Not Activated
TU 116.4.7	Not Assigned	
TU 116.4.8	Rung Sat Special Zone Helo Support Unit A	OIC HAL-3 DET 2
TU 116.4.9	Rung Sat Special Zone Helo Support Unit B	Not Activated
TG 116.5	Not Assigned	
TG 116.6	Delta SEAL Group	OIC SEAL Team Det A
TU 116.6.1	Delta Boat Support Unit	OIC MST-2
TG 116.7	Not Assigned	
TG 116.8	Helicopter Support Group	CO HAL-3
TG 116.9	Not Assigned	
Not Assigned	I Corps River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 55
Not Assigned	I Corps River Patrol Unit A	OIC RIVPATSEC 521

On 9 January River Section 521 commenced GAME WARDEN operations in I Corps Tactical Zone.

On 9 January River Section 534 (TU 116.3.3) commenced operations from APL-55 located near Dong Tam on the My Tho River.

On 10 January Commander Task Force 117 changed operational control of one Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB) to Commander Task Force 116 for a 30-day period to evaluate the suitability of the craft for GAME WARDEN operations. Commander Task Group 116.3 was assigned evaluation responsibility.

On 17 January River Section 524, based at My Tho, commenced operations on the My Tho River.

From 28-31 January, four PBRs from River Section 535 (TU 116.1.3) at Binh Thuy extended GAME WARDEN patrols to the upper Bassac River during the Tet holiday period to prevent an expected influx of enemy supplies from Cambodia. The PBRs were based at the U.S. Special Forces camp at Chau Doc.

From 29-31 January, five PBRs from River Section 513 (TU 116.2.1) the Rung Sat Special Zone to the APL-55 in the Ham Luong River. The platoon vacated task element designator 116.4.0.2 and assumed task element designator 116.3.0.2.

On 29 April USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST846) changed to the operational control of CTF 116 and arrived on station in the Co Chien River. After embarking River Section 523 (TU 116.2.4) and HAL-3, Detachment Four (TU 116.2.8), JENNINGS COUNTY relieved GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786) as TU 116.2.6 and commenced GAME WARDEN operations.

On 29 April SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Seventh Platoon, vacated TU 116.3.0 and was relieved by SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Tenth Platoon, which assumed TE 116.3.0.1.

On 29 April River Section 525 assumed task element designator 116.4.1.4.

On 30 April USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST786) proceeded to Subic Bay, Philippines, for upkeep, changing to the operational control of CTF 76 enroute.

Task Force Organization End of April

<u>Task Designator</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>
CTF 116	COMRIVPATRON	BINH THUY
CTG 116.1	COMRIVDIV 51	BINH THUY
CTU 116.1.0	SEAL TEAM DET ALFA, EIGHT PLT	BINH THUY
CTU 116.1.1	OIC RIVPATSEC 511	BINH THUY
CTU 116.1.2	OIC RIVPATSEC 512	BINH THUY
CTU 116.1.3	OIC RIVPATSEC 513	HARNETT COUNTY
CTU 116.1.4	OIC RIVPATSEC 514	BINH THUY
CTU 116.1.6	CO HARNETT COUNTY (LST821)	BASSAC RIVER
CTU 116.1.8	OIC HAL-3, DET ONE	HARNETT COUNTY
CTU 116.1.9	OIC HAL-3, DET 7	BINH THUY
CTG 116.2	COMRIVDIV 52	VINH LONG
CTU 116.2.0	OIC SEAL TEAM DET ALFA, NINTH PLTN	VINH LONG
CTU 116.2.1	OIC RIVPATSEC 524	SA DEC
CTU 116.2.3	OIC RIVPATSEC 522	VINH LONG
CTU 116.2.4	OIC RIVPATSEC 523	GARRETT COUNTY
CTU 116.2.6	CO JENNINGS COUNTY (LST846)	CO CHIEN RIVER
CTU 116.2.8	OIC HAL-3, DET 4	JENNINGS COUNTY
CTU 116.2.9	OIC HAL-3, DET 3	VINH LONG
CTG 116.3	COMRIVDIV 53	MY THO
CTU 116.3.0	OIC SEAL TEAM DET ALFA, TENTH PLTN	MY THO
CTE 116.3.0.1	OIC SEAL TEAM DET ALFA, TENTH PLTN	MY THO
CTE 116.3.0.2	OIC SEAL TEAM DET GOLF, MIKE PLTN	APL-55
CTU 116.3.1	OIC RIVPATSEC 533	MY THO
CTU 116.3.2	OIC RIVPATSEC 531	MY THO
CTU 116.3.3	OIC RIVPATSEC 534	APL-55
CTU 116.3.4	OIC RIVPATSEC 532	HUNTERDON COUNTY
CTU 116.3.5	OIC RIVPATSEC 535	APL-55
CTU 116.3.6	CO HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST838)	SPECIAL OPS II CTZ
CTU 116.3.8	OIC HAL-3, DET 5	DONG TAM
CTU 116.3.9	OIC HAL-3, DET 6	DONG TAM
CTG 116.4	COMRSSZRIVPATGRU	NHA BE
CTU 116.4.0	OIC SEAL TEAM DET GOLF	NHA BE
CTE 116.4.0.1	OIC MOBILE SUPPORT TEAM THREE	NHA BE
CTE 116.4.0.3	OIC SEAL TEAM DET GOLF, DELTA PLTN	NHA BE

CTE 116.4.0.4	OIC SEAL TEAM DET GOLF, BRAVO PLTN	NHA BE
CTU 116.4.1	COMRIVDIV 54	NHA BE
CTE 116.4.1.1	OIC RIVPATSEC 541	NHA BE
CTE 116.4.1.2	OIC RIVPATSEC 542	NHA BE
CTE 116.4.1.4	OIC RIVPATSEC 525	NHA BE
CTU 116.4.2	OIC MINRON 11 DET ALFA	NHA BE
CTU 116.4.8	OIC HAL-3, DET 2	NHA BE
CTG 116.5	COMRIVRON FIVE	BINH THUY
CTG 116.6	OIC SEAL TEAM DET ALFA	BINH THUY
CTU 116.6.0	SEAL TEAM DET ALFA, EIGHTH PLATOON	BINH THUY
CTU 116.8.1	OIC MOBSUPPORT TEAM TWO	BINH THUY
CTG 116.8	CO HAL-3	VUNG TAU

COMRIVDIV 55 and OIC RIVSEC 521 located Danang. Task designator unassigned these units.

On 1 June, River Section 551 assumed task element designator 116.4.1.6. and River Section 552 assumed task element designator 116.4.1.7. Also APL-55 was reclassified as the YRBM-18.

On 2 June, River Section 543 Detachment "B" vacated task element designator 116.4.1.3 and rejoined River Section 543 Detachment "A" in Danang.

Also on 2 June the PBR base at My Tho received 10-15 rounds of enemy mortar fire. One Navyman was slightly wounded.

On 5 June USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST786) changed to the operational control of CTF 116 and arrived on station in the lower Co Chien River and on 6 June embarked River Section 523 (TU 116.2.4) and Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron THREE, Detachment FOUR (TU 116.2.8), and relieved USS JENNINGS COUNTY (LST846) TU 116.2.6 and commenced GAME WARDEN operations.

On 6 June USS JENNINGS COUNTY proceeded to Japan for overhaul, changing to the operational control of CTF 76 enroute.

On 11 June SEAL Team Detachment GOLF, JULIETT platoon relieved SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Ninth Platoon at Vinh Long and assumed task unit designator 116.6.2. SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Ninth Platoon relieved SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Eighth Platoon at Binh Thuy and assumed task unit designator 116.6.1.

On 16 June River Section 543, under the operational control of CTF CLEARWATER relocated to Cua Viet from Danang.

On 23 June SEAL Team Detachment ALFA, Third Platoon under the operational control of CTG 116.4 became active in the Capital Military District for the defense of Saigon. This was the first use of SEALs in this area.

On 1 June LST-838 HUNTERDON COUNTY departed station on the Ham Luong River, proceeded to My Tho and debarked River Section 532, which vacated task unit designator 116.3.4 and assumed 116.3.1. After embarking River Section 533, which vacated task unit designator 116.3.1 and assumed 116.3.4, HUNTERDON COUNTY proceeded to station on the lower Ham Luong River.

On 1 June Task Force 116 realigned task organization as follows:

<u>Numerical Designator</u>	<u>Operational Title</u>	<u>Command</u>
TF 116	River Patrol Force	COMRIVPATFOR
TG 116.1	Bassac River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 51
TG 116.2	Co Chien River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 52
TG 116.3	My Tho River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 53
TG 116.4	Rung Sat Special Zone Patrol Group	RSSZ Advisor
TG 116.5	Upper Mekong Delta River Patrol Group	COMRIVDIV 55
TG 116.6	Special Operations Group	OINC SEAL Team Det ALFA
TG 116.7	PBR Support Group	COMRIVRON 5
TG 116.8	Helio Support Group	CO HA(L)-3
TG 116.9	Special River Support Group	COMRIVPATFOR

The task force organization was revised to establish the Upper Delta River Patrol Group (TG 116.5), the Special Operations Group (TG 116.6), the PBR Support Group (TG 116.7) and the Special Operations River Patrol Group (TG 116.9).

APPENDIX E  
CHARACTERISTICS OF GAME WARDEN ASSETS

This appendix describes the major boats and aircraft used in Game Warden operations.

#### UH-1B HELICOPTER

Length	53 feet
Takeoff weight	8,500 pounds
Patrol speed	80 knots
Maximum gunship combat load speed	90 knots
Endurance at patrol speed	1½ hours
Armament	7-rocket pack of forward-firing 2.75-inch rockets on either side of aircraft 7.62mm. machine guns mounted over rocket packs Freely trainable machine gun operated by each door gunner 1-50-caliber and 1-M-60 (7.62mm.) in lead helo 2-M60s in wing helo Grenades and small arms
Crew:	Pilot, copilot and 2 door gunners

## GAME WARDEN AFLOAT BASES

In addition to the LSTs, there were 5 other Game Warden afloat bases:

- 3 YRBMs (nonself-propelled repair, berthing, and messing barge)
- 1 APL (nonself-propelled barracks craft) combined with a YR (nonself-propelled floating workshop)
- 1 mobile support base (a complex of Ammi barges designed to provide berthing, messing, repair, command, and control facilities for a section of 10 PBRs, and accommodations for 2 helicopters.

## TANK LANDING SHIP (LST)

LENGTH: 328 FEET  
BEAM: 50 FEET  
DRAFT: 14 FEET  
DISPLACEMENT: 1,653 TONS STANDARD, 2,366 TONS BEACHING  
(4,080 TONS FULL LOAD)  
ARMAMENT: 7-40mm. AA: 2-20mm. AA  
DRIVE: DIESEL, 2 SHAFTS  
COMPLEMENT: 119 (ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 266)



## EARLY PROBLEMS WITH PBRs (MK I)

After several months of operation, problems noted with the PBRs were premature aging, corrosion, and deterioration of the hull, pump drive shaft, and surface corrosion of the pump grill. Because of the long patrol hours, there was little time for maintenance. There were not many replacement parts, and crews were not experienced in repairing PBRs. By mid-1968, spare parts had caught up with the demand and maintenance crews had become skilled in working with glass fiber.

Speed was the PBR's best defense against the enemy, and speed was lost because of the deterioration of the Jacuzzi<sup>1</sup> pump and excessive weight. In September 1966, a modified Jacuzzi pump was installed in 3 PBRs by the manufacturer's technical representatives. A considerable improvement in speed resulted.

Because of the constant bottom fouling problems, it was recommended that swimmers be used to clean bottoms and intakes for PBRs. Divers cleared rice, grass, weeds, fish, and snakes from the pumps. This problem would continue to plague the PBRs.

Several PBRs experienced hull cracks resulting in absorption of water by the styrofoam hull reinforcement. The hull cracks were apparently caused by repeated hoisting and lowering in moderate seas and heavy weather. Up to 100 gallons of water had been drained from individual PBRs after operations.


Improved PBRs (Mk II), ordered early in 1967, had aluminum gunwalls installed to protect the sides when junks and sampans came alongside for inspection. The pump installed in the Mk II could be adapted for use in the Mk I PBR to provide greater speed.

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. manufacturer of the pump assembly.


### RIVER PATROL BOAT (PBR)

**LENGTH:** 28 FEET  
**BEAM:** 12.5 FEET  
**DRAFT:** 10 INCHES  
**ARMAMENT:** 1-Mk 36 50-CALIBER TWIN MACHINE GUN  
1-30-CALIBER M1919AH  
1-40mm. (RAPID-FIRE) Mk 18 GRENADE LAUNCHES PIGGY-BACK  
PYROTECHNICS SMALL ARMS  
**DRIVE:** DIESEL (JET PUMPS)  
**COMPLEMENT:** ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 4 OR 5  
**HULL MATERIAL:** FIBERGLASS  
**RANGE:** 150 n.mi. AT 25 KNOTS (TOP SPEED, 35 KNOTS)



### MINE SWEEPING BOAT (MSB)

**LENGTH:** 57 FEET  
**BEAM:** 15 FEET  
**DRAFT:** 5.5 FEET (MAXIMUM)  
**DISPLACEMENT:** 45 TONS (FULL LOAD)  
**ARMAMENT:** 1-50-CALIBER MACHINE GUN  
4-30-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS  
2 Mk 18 GRENADE LAUNCHERS  
**DRIVE:** DIESEL REDUCTION  
**COMPLEMENT:** 6 OR 7 (NO ACCOMMODATIONS)  
**SPEED:** 11 KNOTS, 6.5 KNOTS SWEEPING



APPENDIX F  
FORCE LEVELS

Information has been obtained from the NASVA data base on the average number of U.S. Navy units assigned, available, and employed by Game Warden from the second quarter of 1966 through the third quarter of 1968.

NASVA omits mentioning the 4 LSTs committed to Game Warden; 3 of these were always on station after 1967. During the second and third quarters of 1967, the decrease in use of PBRs was because of damage.

There is a large discrepancy between the number of MSBs assigned and available and those employed after the second quarter of 1967, especially during the fourth quarter of that year. No explanation has been found for this discrepancy; it may be that there is an error in the program or data base.




FIG. F-1: AVERAGE NUMBER OF UH-1s (U.S. ARMY)




FIG. F-2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF PBRs (U.S. NAVY)




FIG. F-3: AVERAGE NUMBER OF MSBs (U.S. NAVY)

TABLE F-1

## AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNITS ASSIGNED

	Date									
	<u>2/66</u>	<u>3/66</u>	<u>4/66</u>	<u>1/67</u>	<u>2/67</u>	<u>3/67</u>	<u>4/67</u>	<u>1/68</u>	<u>2/68</u>	<u>3/68</u>
LCM					1.36	5.01	6.93	7.00	5.22	1.08
LCPL				0.9	1.89	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.73	1.23
LCVP					0.08					
LSM				0.9	.15					
MSB	0.40	10.04	11.35	11.11	12.89	11.68	17.48	9.78	6.54	7.61
MSC						1.72				
MSO						0.30				
PACV	0.45		0.84							
PBR	16.19	72.11	109.49	117.28	119.44	118.02	116.98	140.65	162.50	203.57
RPC			1.61	2.41	1.83					
UH-1	1.71	5.44	6.35	6.52	8.08	14.00	19.88	20.16	20.84	22.55

TABLE F-2

## AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNITS AVAILABLE

	Date									
	<u>2/66</u>	<u>3/66</u>	<u>4/66</u>	<u>1/67</u>	<u>2/67</u>	<u>3/67</u>	<u>4/67</u>	<u>1/68</u>	<u>2/68</u>	<u>3/68</u>
LCM					1.19	4.90	6.71	6.93	5.22	0.47
LCPL				0.74	1.89	2.00	2.00	1.86	1.73	0.24
LCVP					0.08					
LSM				0.90	0.15					
MSB	0.26	8.83	10.54	9.11	10.85	9.28	17.09	9.22	5.92	7.07
MSC						1.65				
MSO						0.30				
PACV	0.42		0.53							
PBR	13.83	64.4	102.39	113.34	111.44	105.34	102.86	121.6	145.83	187.19
RPC			1.4	2.19	1.53					
UH-1	1.32	3.6	4.51	6.63	6.17	10.25	14.59	13.86	14.11	16.37

TABLE F-3

## AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNITS EMPLOYED

	Date									
	<u>2/66</u>	<u>3/66</u>	<u>4/66</u>	<u>1/67</u>	<u>2/67</u>	<u>3/67</u>	<u>4/67</u>	<u>1/68</u>	<u>2/68</u>	<u>3/68</u>
LCM					0.56	3.39	3.92	4.34	3.20	0.08
LCPL				0.30	0.72	0.58	0.62	0.45	0.17	0.06
LCVP					0.02					
LSM				0.50	0.03					
MSB	0.13	7.11	8.6	7.93	6.99	4.14	5.05	3.01	2.07	2.58
MSC						0.30				
MSO						0.00				
PACV	0.22		0.31							
PBR	11.71	56.34	81.38	91.88	91.63	87.77	87.31	109.59	125.63	160.92
RPC			0.8	1.67	1.19					
UH-1	.81	3.00	3.64	3.99	5.38	9.04	11.91	12.24	12.00	13.71

APPENDIX G  
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

This appendix was reprinted from the February 1967 TF 116 River Patrol Force OpOrder. After October 1966, the rules of engagement were revised to allow patrol craft commanders to direct fire against an evading watercraft.

Operation Order  
COMRIVPATFOR No. 201-YR

Naval Forces Vietnam  
Task Force 116  
River Patrol Force  
Can Tho, Vietnam  
DTG: 010001H FEB 1967  
Message Ref: TUS 025

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX B

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: COMCOSURVFOR (CTF 115) OPORDER NO. 201-YR

1. DEFINITIONS:

a. RVN Territorial Seas: A belt of sea adjacent to the RVN three miles in breadth measured from the low water mark along the coast.

b. Inland Waters: Waters to landward of the territorial seas.

c. Contiguous Zone: A zone of the high seas, contiguous to the territorial area of the RVN and extending to a maximum of 12 miles from the base line from which the territorial sea is measured.

d. Defensive Sea Areas (DSA): The territorial waters of RVN have been declared a Defensive Sea Area by the Government of Vietnam. Ships of any country operating within the territorial sea are subject to visit and search if not clearly engaged in innocent passage. The GVN has further proclaimed that within the contiguous zone (12 miles) vessels suspected of preparing to infringe upon the customs, fiscal, sanitary or immigration regulations (i.e., infiltrate) are subject to visit and search and possible arrest and disposition, and that the GVN has requested and received the assistance of the United States for the full cooperation of the U.S. Navy with the naval forces of the RVN to enforce the above measures.

e. International Inland Rivers: A term established by a treaty between Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam which declared that navigation is free upon the Mekong River and its navigable tributaries, issues and mouths situated within the territory of the contracting nations as well as upon all the waterways giving access to the ports of Saigon and the sea; that within the laws and customs regulations of each nation, navigation between Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and the sea by the waterways described above is considered maritime navigation. This freedom of navigation is granted freely to those nations recognized diplomatically by the contracting nations. Freedom of navigation by merchant ships of nations not recognized diplomatically by the contraction nations is subject to the agreement

Operation Order

COMRIVPATFOR No. 201-YR

of these nations. Vietnamese regulations currently prohibit passage by ships of nations, except Cambodia, not recognizing Vietnam. This prohibition includes ships of Indonesia, North Vietnam, Communist China and other Communist Bloc nations. The treaty further provides that to avoid any irregular debarkation on Vietnamese territory during passage of vessels between the mouths of the Mekong and the Cambodian borders, Vietnamese customs agents will escort the vessels between the Mekong mouths and the Cambodian border; that navigation of the Mekong as defined above must conform to the national laws and regulations, notably in matters of sanitation, police and customs and for the maintenance of general security; that each nation has the right to subject the transportation of persons and merchandise to certain conditions and that freedom of navigation will not be hindered by these conditions.

f. Immediate (HOT) Pursuit: Pursuit initiated in response to actions or attack by hostile aircraft or vessels as defined in these rules of engagement. The pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted and may be extended as necessary and feasible over territorial and international air space and seas as prescribed herein.

g. Friendly Forces: (As defined in paragraph 1.b. of the basic OpOrder).

h. Hostile Aircraft: An aircraft in the air space of the RVN which:

(1) Is visually identified or is designated by the U.S. Director of the Tactical Air Coordination Center (TACC), and Air Force Control and Reporting Center (CRC), or their authorized representatives, as a hostile aircraft operating in RVN territorial air space without proper clearance from the government; or

(2) Is observed in one of the following acts:

(a) Attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack U.S./friendly forces or installation.

(b) Laying mines, without the permission of the government concerned, within friendly territorial seas or inland waters.

(c) Releasing free drops, parachutes, or gliders over RVN territory without permission of the government and obviously not in distress. The foregoing includes the unauthorized landing of troops or material on RVN territory.

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i. Hostile Vessel (Surface or sub-surface):

(1) A vessel in RVN inland waters and territorial seas or adjacent international waters which is engaged in one of the following acts:

(a) Attacking or acting in a manner which indicates within reasonable certainty an intent to attack U.S./friendly forces or installations, including the unauthorized landing of troops or material on friendly territory.

(b) Laying mines within RVN territorial seas or inland waters without permission of the government.

(c) Engaged in direct support of attacks against the RVN.

j. Hostile Ground Forces: Those ground forces which attack U.S. or friendly forces or installations.

k. Visit: Boarding a vessel with intent to search.

l. Search: Inspecting the vessel's papers and examination of the vessel and its cargo.

2. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: The following Rules of Engagement cover those general situations expected to be encountered and will be observed by the River Patrol Force (SEALS withstanding):

a. River Patrol Force units are authorized:

(1) Within the rivers and contiguous zone of the RVN to demand the identification and a declaration of intent and to stop, visit and search vessels flying the RVN flag, or flying no flag (less foreign flag steel-hull merchant ships, warships and military, police or customs craft) which give a manifestly false response to the demand for identification and declaration of intent, or view other valid grounds for suspicion that all or part of their cargo or personnel is intended to be or has been taken directly into the RVN or is being transshipped within the RVN in violation of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws of the RVN.

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(2) Steel-hull merchant shipping of any foreign flag will not be stopped, visited and searched unless specifically authorized by CTF 116. TF 116 units will report to CTF 116 by immediate message a description of actions of foreign flag merchant ships providing a basis for suspicion of violation of innocent passage including time, position, type of suspicious activity, name, nationality and ship type of the vessel in question and will meanwhile shadow or maintain a radar plot of the suspected ship. In the case of merchant ships off-loading cargo to watercraft or dropping items over the side while on international inland waterways, every effort will be made to obtain photographs; to apprehend the watercraft upon departure from alongside the ship, and to recover items dropped overboard.

(a) River Patrol Force units will take particular care to ensure that their actions and maneuvers cannot be construed as harassing foreign flag merchant ships and that their actions in no way interfere with the transit of such shipping on the international inland waterways.

(3) To detain the following which have been intercepted pursuant to the above, until custody is assured by RVN forces:

(a) Vessels determined to have violated or to be preparing to violate laws and regulations of the RVN, including violation of curfew regulations, or which have engaged in hostile actions incident to interception.

(b) A vessel which refuses to permit visit, or having been visited, refuses to permit search.

(c) An intercepted vessel which fails to proceed as previously stated or directed.

(d) Personnel embarked on intercepted vessels who are without identification or who have improper identification or who have engaged in hostile action incident to interception.

(4) To return fire when fired upon by hostile ground forces, watercraft or aircraft as defined herein and to fire in support of friendly units receiving hostile fire.

(5) To fire warning shots in order to stop indigenous watercraft for visit and search. Due care must be exercised as to fall of shot.

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(6) The minimum force necessary to accomplish patrol operations shall be exercised, up to and including destruction if required.

(a) Violators of curfew and prohibited zones (who may or may not be subjected to gunfire by the VNN) shall not be fired upon by River Patrol Force units unless the violator qualified as a hostile vessel in accordance with subparagraph 1.e. of this Appendix or attempts to evade and ignores warnings to stop.

(b) Every peaceful method at hand shall first be exhausted when attempting to stop a junk or sampan for boarding and searches. This failing, warning shots may be used as the next step. If it is obvious the junk or sampan is deliberately trying to evade, direct fire may be used as a last resort. Firing shall be ceased if the junk or sampan appears to be stopping.

(c) It is permissible to continue direct fire against an evading junk that beaches and against its fleeing occupants provided the firing is not in the vicinity of a hamlet or village. Any fire in the vicinity of a hamlet or village must be conducted strictly in accordance with Appendix IV to Annex B.

(7) To conduct immediate pursuit as necessary and feasible pursuant to the above rules over inland, contiguous and international waters and air spaces except that:

(a) No pursuit is authorized into the inland waters or the air spaces of Cambodia.

(b) River Patrol Force units will not approach the Cambodian border closer than three nautical miles at the points where the Mekong and Bassac Rivers enter Cambodia without the prior approval of CTF 116.

b. River Patrol Force units will

(1) Permit a vessel and embarked personnel not subject to detention to proceed to the stated port of destination.

(2) Recognize the possibility of language difficulties and allow sufficient time for vessel's master to fully realize the consequences for failure to properly respond.

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(3) Not initiate any attack on ground forces or watercraft without the specific authority of CTG 116.1 or CTG 116.2, as appropriate, and the cognizant TOC. This does not limit firing in self-defense, firing in support of other friendly units requiring immediate assistance, firing of warning shots to stop watercraft for visit and search, or taking under direct fire junks and sampans that ignore warnings to stop and deliberately attempt to evade.

(4) Exercise the minimum force necessary to accomplish their mission.

(5) Display sound judgment in replying to fire from the vicinity of populated areas to ensure that unnecessary civilian casualties do not occur.

(6) Make an immediate report to CTG 116.1 or CTG 116.2, as appropriate, of incidents involving the talking under fire of hostile vessels, aircraft or ground forces. The task group commander will immediately report the incident to CTF 116 and the appropriate TOC and/or CSC.

c. Procedures for visit and search will be in accordance with the guidance of Appendix III to Annex B.

3. Rules of Engagement for SEAL

a. SEAL team detachments are now operating with GAME WARDEN forces in the Rung Sat Special Zone and the Delta. Due to the special nature of their operations, normal GAME WARDEN rules of engagement, as stated in the basic operation order, cannot, in their entirety, apply to SEAL operations. Consequently, these special rules of engagement are hereby promulgated and will be adhered to during all SEAL operations:

(1) All SEAL operations (ambush, reconnaissance, etc.) will be cleared by the appropriate Vietnamese authority through his U.S. counterpart. They will be cleared at the lowest echelon necessary, but it should not be necessary to clear lower than the district chief.

(2) Curfews and other restrictions imposed by GVN authority must be known by SEAL teams prior to any operation.

(3) SEAL teams must be intimately familiar with population patterns in the operating area to avoid inadvertent casualties to innocent persons.

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(4) The decision to open fire at a target in a specific area will depend on whether or not that area has been designated a "Free Fire" area by GVN authorities.

(5) Offensive type actions will only be conducted in "Free Fire" areas or in areas specifically cleared by the District Chief or other GVN authority.

(6) Teams are permitted to return fire when fired upon and to fire in support of friendly units receiving hostile fire.

(7) Teams may conduct immediate pursuit as necessary and feasible; however, no pursuit is authorized across the borders into Cambodia.

4. SUPPORTING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

a. Within assigned areas of responsibility, local tactical considerations may dictate the requirements for additional and more detailed Rules of Engagement for the Delta River and RSSZ River Patrol Groups. As operational experience is gained Commander Delta River Patrol Group (CTG 116.1) will develop jointly, with the Senior Advisor Fourth Corps, supporting Rules of Engagement for the Delta River Patrol Group (TG 116.1) and Commander RSSZ River Patrol Group (CTG 116.2) will develop supporting Rules of Engagement for the RSSZ River Patrol Group (TG 116.2). These rules will include the applicable Rules of Engagement cited herein and may further restrict these rules. All supporting Rules of Engagement and subsequent changes will be submitted to the Commander River Patrol Force (CTF 116) for approval prior to promulgation.

b. Commander Inshore Support Unit (CTU 116.8.5) will insure that embarked helicopters, when operating within IV CTZ, adhere to applicable IV Corps LOIs and other Rules of Engagement.

c. Annexes D and I to the reference establish Rules of Engagement and Visit and Search Procedures for Coastal Surveillance Force units and will be referred to by Commander Inshore Support Unit (CTU 116.8.5) for additional background information and guidance in the conduct of offshore surveillance and merchant ship visit and search operations. It should be noted that the Rules of Engagement established by this OpOrder provide restrictions in the case of foreign flag shipping in addition to the restrictions imposed by Annex D to the reference.

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5. DEFENSIVE ACTION. Except for the limitations imposed by subparagraph 2.a.(6)(a) of this Appendix, nothing in these rules or in rules subsequently promulgated by task group commanders modifies or will modify in any manner the requirement of a military commander to defend his unit against armed attack with all means at his disposal. In the event of such attack, the commander concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force.

B. B. WITHAM, JR.  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Commander River Patrol Force

Authenticated:

/s/

L. L. STINE, JR.  
Chief Staff Officer