country. I agree that one should try and think. I have searched my mind for some kind of action. I cannot think of it.

I think that what in fact is happening is that the regime has cut itself off from most of the world. I described in my statement while you were on the phone that they have been engaged in consolidating and to some extent regularizing the regime and moving into a little more contact with the outside world. I think they are settling down a little bit. They think they are. They think they have turned a corner of some sort.

Mr. Solarz. Why do you think they embarked on this effort not only to systematically slaughter such a large percentage of their own people, but also to completely depopulate the cities and to utterly restructure the society?

Mr. Poole. The cities of Cambodia are not normally cities. They are towns. They were made cities by civil war. They had no choice but to move the people back to the countryside. They could have done it better, but they had no choice except to—

Mr. Solarz. But they reduced the population, as I understand it, in places like Phnom Penh to far below what it was before the war.

Mr. Poole. Yes. They obviously overdid it. They obviously did it very badly. But the general thrust of moving the people out of the city was something that practically any regime would have contemplated and done at some stage in that year, getting the people back on the land and producing rice.

Mr. Solarz. But they seemed to be—

Mr. Poole. But that, however, doesn't respond to you in full, if I might just finish my answer to your question. That is ground that has been gone over a lot and you have probably read about it and I have read about it, and others have heard about it and it isn't really the salient point.

The point is: Why did they kill a lot of people? Why did they do it so brutally? And the best answer I have been able to come up with there—and I have thought about it and done some research on it—is, first off, that they took over at a time when society was in ruins, so that there were no normal means of government. This doesn't excuse them. But it is a fact. It is a background fact that is relevant to understanding what happened.

The country was in a state of social, political, and economic chaos when they took over. So there is that background fact.

The second part is that the only means they had for running the country was this, what I have described as an ignorant peasant teenage army—a rather large, very obedient army, well armed and totally flexible, totally obedient to orders. If they were told to march people down the road a couple of kilometers, the likelihood is that they would shoot the ones that didn't do it, simply because they had no orders not to.

Mr. Solarz. How were they able to establish that sense of total discipline in the ranks of their army?

Mr. Poole. I don't know the answer to that question. I assume that, if you are trying to run and organize a guerrilla force and your objective is to take over the capital of the country, that they went about it in a businesslike manner.
Mr. Solarz. Was there any indication in any of the statements that were made by the Khmer Rouge leaders prior to the fall of the Lon Nol regime which would have indicated that, once they came to power, something approximating what actually happened was in store for the country? That they were planning to embark on a systematic effort to exterminate families who were associated with the old regime and to establish what was in essence a completely agrarian society, not simply by removing the excess population from the villages, but virtually by moving the entire population into the countryside?

Mr. Poole. You have put your finger on a very tragic fact, tragic for everybody in this room, because everybody who was thinking about Cambodia in the spring of 1975—and Congress had to think about it and Cambodian scholars had to think about it and Cambodians living outside the country had to think about it and journalists had to think about it—was wondering about cutting off aid, and our operative assumption—and I wrote some articles saying it—was that normalcy would break out, that fraternization between the two sides in the civil war would be what everybody would be striving for.

And I think Ambassador Dean, testifying before this committee about a year ago, said he thought that that was in Long Boret's mind when he gave himself up and went back. I mean, took Lon Nol out of the country and went back and gave himself up. I am not sure if all of the Khmer elite assumed there would be reconciliation; but it was the assumption of a lot of people that peace, however it was going to be, was going to be better than this damn war. I think that is why Congress cut off aid. And at the time, I certainly felt they were right in thinking that.

Mr. Solarz. Well, I remember participating in debates within our committee which I think really signalled the end of the continuing American involvement there. Once we rejected President Ford's request for additional funds, that was the end of it. It was only a matter of days before the government fell.

I think you are absolutely right. It was everybody's assumption that, whatever might happen after the war, it could not possibly be worse than a continuation of the war itself.

Mr. Barron. Sir, I would like to respond quickly to two or three points that have arisen in the recent discussions and hence are in the record. We spoke to at least one, and I seem to recall two, Cambodian refugees who stated that, prior to the end of the war, they had been told by captured Khmer Rouge soldiers that, upon—

Mr. Solarz. Who said this?

Mr. Barron. These are refugees we interviewed. They reported that they had been told prior to the end of the war, at least one of them did, that captured Khmer Rouge soldiers had stated that, at the end of the war, the cities would be emptied of all people.

Second, there is an, to me, impressive study made by Kenneth M. Quinn who was then in the State Department in Cambodia, about the regimen of life, the procedures and methods employed by the Khmer Rouge in those territories occupied long before the end of the war.

In this study, we can see precedents for much that did in fact happen. So I think there were data, there were indications of what might happen. Perhaps we didn't pay enough attention.
Mr. Poole. I agree with that.

Mr. Solarz. Does the leadership of the organization, as it were, consciously identify itself as Marxist in any way, shape, manner, or form?

Mr. Barron. Yes. This is something of an embarrassment to the Communists or Marxists, but they have. They were, many of them, recruited into the Communist movement in their student days in France.

Mr. Solarz. Do we have any sense of what, from a Marxist point of view, their compatriots in Peking or in Moscow make of this rather un-Marxist effort to establish an agrarian society in the name of a philosopher who heralded the triumph of the urban proletariat?

Mr. Porter. Could I just very briefly address that? I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding here of what the objectives of the present government are. I mean this has been stated over and over again in the American press, that what they are trying to do is to return to the 18th century, primitive, rural society. And this is part of the purpose, at least, of breaking up the cities and dispersing the population in the countryside.

As Dr. Poole has stated, I think one has to begin with the point that it was impossible in fact to sustain any kind of reasonable urban life on any kind of scale, given the economic situation at the end of the war, and that was in fact a reasonable policy to follow, to disperse people back to the countryside where they could both grow food and eat the food that was already stockpiled in the countryside.

Mr. Solarz. Was it reasonable to forcibly evacuate everybody who was a patient in a hospital, regardless of how seriously they were ill or wounded, and force them to join a death march to the countryside? Was that reasonable?

Mr. Porter. I think—I mean I have written one chapter of a book on that. It goes into that subject in some detail. We examined very carefully the medical situation in the hospitals of Phnom Penh, and I don't know if you recall the testimony which was given in the last year of the war about the medical situation in Phnom Penh, but it was beyond belief. It was literally a place of death, where the patients were brought, both soldiers and civilians.

There was not, in fact, a reasonably functioning medical system in Phnom Penh. These hospitals were places where the toilets overflowed into the hallways, where there were patients lying in the hallways.

And I do indeed think that one can argue that it was a reasonable alternative to move the patients as fast as possible to locations outside the cities where there were in fact other medical facilities, not good medical facilities, but, in the circumstances which existed in Phnom Penh at the end of the war, probably better than what existed there.

Mr. Solarz. Do you really believe what you are saying?

Mr. Porter. I am sorry. Maybe you could make clear what you find objectionable about that.

Mr. Solarz. This isn't some kind of a put-on where you are playing a role? I mean you actually believe that what you have said is true, that this characterizes——

Mr. Porter. Congressman, did you in fact read the testimony about the medical situation in Phnom Penh at the end of the war? Do you know what I am talking about?
Mr. SOLARZ. I assume that the conditions were somewhat less acceptable than they are in the municipal hospitals in the city of New York, but that hardly persuades me that medical conditions were better in the nonexistent facilities in the countryside to which these people were sent, regardless of their condition.

There are some people who are better off lying in bed because of their condition than they are participating in a forced march without any food or water provided for them en route to their unknown destinations, and without doctors, nurses, or other medical facilities to greet them.

Mr. PORTER. Let me just add that there was one hospital in Phnom Penh that was regarded as reasonably functioning—and that is by any kind of medical standards—and that was the Kalmette Hospital which was run by the French. And that was a hospital which in fact was not turned out into the countryside. It was taken over by the Communists and they continued to run it.

So my point is that I think you are operating on a very inadequate base of information when you make statements that patients were turned out into the countryside in a death march for some strange reasons which could not be understood.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. FRASER. There has been a lot of ground covered in the questions. Do any of the witnesses want to respond further?

Mr. CHANDLER. I would like to say a couple of things, if I could. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I was told by Representative Goodling that one administration thought it right to bomb Cambodia, and now another administration thinks it right to think about human rights. God knows what the next administration is going to do.

We have got to keep one thing in mind. That is, the Cambodians had human rights while we were bombing them under Nixon, and they have got them now. And I think we would have been a lot better off thinking things through, as I said in my opening remarks.

The second point—and I am sorry if I am going to show some feelings here. I didn’t come down to Washington to be told that I am cowardly and that my morals are contemptible. I didn’t come here to be told that my concern for the Cambodian people was less than that of anybody else in this room.

As a matter of fact, as I said before, I am certain that nearly all of the personal friends, very close personal friends, that Peter and I had in Cambodia have been shot because of the jobs they held under the old regime, or because they didn’t take the revolutionary side. Now, let me move off that and say here that there is a background for the Khmer Rouge behavior, and this has been gone into by people who have done research in the background of their movement, and it seems to me, in disagreement with Dr. Poole, that it was not surprising that they behaved the way they did, and, in disagreement perhaps with Dr. Porter, they had a great contempt or, as they call it, a great anger for the civilization that existed in Phnom Penh when they took it over.

Now, why did they have this contempt? Well, some of them—ideologues, if you will, who have picked up their—You don’t just pick up—I don’t think you pick up Marxism as a disease. I am not a Marxist myself, but it seems to me many of these students in Paris
in the 1950’s began to look at Cambodian society from a certain dis-
tance and saw that it was riddled with injustice. I could see this in
Cambodia when I was there. All sorts of people would admit this.
And, if it was riddled with injustice, the Marxists thought, there
must be a way out, through some kind of master plan, which they
worked out in detail: Cambodia should stop being dependent on
foreign aid, for one thing, stop being dependent on foreign markets,
and that also the individual farmer should stop being dependent on
money-lending Chinese merchants.
OK. These are economic problems. Also in the forests to which they
went in the early 1960’s, developing ideology under pressure of the
war, they decided that the people who were not their friends were their
enemies and that the people who were their biggest enemies of all were
the United States.
Now, I am not saying that this obsolves them in any way, or that it
absolves us either. I agree that we should increase our moral concern,
but our moral concern for Cambodia and for the Cambodian people
should be connected with our realization that for the first time in our
history we bombed a country that had never fired a shot at an Ameri-
can soldier. I think this is very different from, well, “bombs fall all
over,” as you suggested, that wars go on—or maybe it was Represen-
tative Goodling. After the war in that scenario, everybody shakes
hands as if it had been a game.
The Cambodian war, it seems to me, was an extremely brutal war,
by all, let us say, three sides: The Lon Noi government, the insurrec-
tionists, and the Americans. And I would like to leave my statement
at that, trying to inject, if I can, a few nuances into the argument this
afternoon and making the injection of nuances in no way the same
thing as trying to be morally indifferent to what is going on in the
country.
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, if I could make just one observation
here, because I wouldn’t want Dr. Chandler or anybody else to mis-
understand my own views. I think what we did in Cambodia was con-
temptible. I think that, had we not launched the in.vasion of Cambodia,
we probably wouldn’t have set in motion the course of events which led
to the present state of affairs in that unfortunate country.
To that extent, obviously, we do bear a significant measure of re-
ponsibility for having helped to produce this disaster.
But I also think that there is not a country in the world that isn’t
riddled with injustice. At the same time, I think there is no society
so unjust that it can justify what has happened in Cambodia, pre-
sumably in the name of dealing with injustice.
Mr. CHANDLER. I am justifying nothing. I never used the word
“justify.” You put it in my mouth.
Mr. SOLARZ. If I did, then I regret it. It may well be that, by their
own misguided lights, people who are responsible for what is happen-
ing in Cambodia think that they are rectifying ancient wrongs and
creating conditions for a more just society in the future. I haven’t had
the opportunity to speak with them or to psychoanalyze them.
But one doesn’t have to come to the conclusion that these people are
maniacal murderers in order to come to the conclusion that what they
are doing is not only profoundly wrong, but profoundly immoral, and,
simply because it may be done in the name of creating a better society—and I don't mean to suggest this is your point of view—hardly justifies it.

There are certain objective facts which I submit we are obligated to respond to. I remember an old saying that the only thing which is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.

For my own part, I think there are certain situations which are objectively so horrendous that they oblige all people of good will and decency, however sullied their own credentials may be, to attempt to do something to correct a very terrible wrong.

Mr. Porter. Mr. Chairman, I did have other documentation which I wanted to present in support of the rather unpopular notion apparently that what everyone else seems to assume is automatically the truth is not in fact.

I did want to mention the fact that the book by Francois Ponchaud, which has been cited by Jean Lacouture in support of the idea that the present government is genocidal—and in fact coined the term “autogenocide”—is one that I think bears closer examination in terms of how it contrasts with the way it has been publicized here in this country. And I will not go into details, but I will simply state for the record that every single reference to Francois Ponchaud’s book by Jean Lacouture in his review in the New York Review of Books, which has been cited in the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and elsewhere, is false and misleading. That is to say, it misrepresents the substance of what Ponchaud says. It presents material as an official document of the government when, in fact, it was a comment by Thai journalists, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. Solarz. Mr. Chairman, since ultimately the record will one day be printed of these proceedings and there may be from time to time people who attempt to establish the accuracy of what has been said here, I would hope that at this point in the record the review in the New York Review of Books be included so that we can enable those who read the record to see the review and make a judgment themselves.1

Mr. Porter. I would also request, however, that an analysis of that review, which includes the original documentation from the book itself, be included. I hope that would be acceptable.

Mr. Fraser. Do you have that analysis?

Mr. Porter. I do have an analysis which I can provide for the record. Yes.2

Is that acceptable, Congressman?

Mr. Solarz. It is perfectly acceptable to me, but the chairman will determine that.

Mr. Porter. The point I want to make in regard to Francois Ponchaud, the author of this book, who did a great deal of interviewing of refugees and careful sort of combing through the available documentation, is that he wrote a monograph in early 1976 in which he stated that, although there were violent repression of officers and other officials in the provinces of Battambang and Siemreap that in other provinces the refugees did not report the massive purges that they did in

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1 See appendix 2, p. 56.
2 Not available at time of printing.
those provinces and that, although certain categories of people were sent, as they said, to higher authority, Angka Loeu, from which they did not return to their villages, that there were, however, prison camps for the military officers and men where executions were not taking place. That is, the reports from the refugee sources that he had were that these camps were not places where people were systematically being exterminated.

Now, I want to add one other point which I think is relevant to the question of whether in fact there was a policy of massive extermination, and that is an article from La Figaro, February 11, by an intellectual, a doctor from Phnom Penh who underwent a rather elaborate process of reeducation in post war Cambodia.

This is relevant for the reason that it is stated time and time again that the difference between the Vietnamese and Cambodians' postwar policies was that Vietnam did have resort to reeducation whereas the Cambodians paid no attention to that and simply exterminated.

This article has a very detailed account of the process of reeducation, and I think it is relevant to try to decide whether in fact there was an official policy for the extermination of these various classes.1

Now just one more point, and that is, if, in fact, the Congressman feels that it is incumbent on Congress to take action legislatively in some way to deal with regimes which have undertaken massive systematic killing, slaughter, massacre, I would suggest that you might take a look at the regime in Indonesia where the regime itself has officially confirmed that they did kill 450,000 to 500,000 people in 1965. To my knowledge, there have been no regrets expressed there. To my knowledge, the U.S. Government—neither the U.S. Government nor Congress has taken any kind of action in that regard. I suggest this is an area you might usefully look into.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes. I would agree with the witness that what happened in Indonesia is a moral abomination as well. Of course, you know, that was close to a decade ago, and the murders have come to an end. I certainly think we ought to express our regrets as to what happened then, but right now we are confronted with an ongoing situation in Cambodia. From everything that I can determine, even if the killings have more or less come to an end on a massive basis, although I gather there are still some going on, it would appear to me, from what I have heard and what I have read, that the country has been turned into a kind of vast concentration camp, as it were. People are obligated to work from dawn till dusk and attend indoctrination sessions in the evening, where they are given a mere pittance to eat, where they are not permitted to go from one place to another within the country, where the kind of situation exists, in short, which is far, far worse than that which exists in many other repressive regimes around the world, with respect to which we have expressed concern in the Congress.

And I just think that what we have here might almost be sui generis, thereby requiring an exceptional and maybe extraordinary response on our part.

Bad as the situation may be in South Korea and in Chile, and in other parts of the world, I think here it appears to be demonstrably

1 See appendix 3, p. 59.
worse. I don't necessarily have any answers, but I think we have to see what we can do.

I am considering introducing a resolution along these lines, and I hope that the distinguished chairman of the committee would be able to give that some thought, because obviously his judgment counts a lot not only with me, but with other members of the committee.

I would just hope that, when the history of this sad and sorry episode is ultimately written, no one will be able to say that the U.S. Congress and the American people let it pass without any official commentary or effort to do something, however modest it might have been, about it.

Mr. Barron. Mr. Porter has cited four separate segments of evidence to substantiate his challenge of the assumption that great death has occurred in Cambodia.

Mr. Porter. Excuse me. If I could correct that, my point was about whether there was a policy of extermination of classes.

Mr. Barron. Policy of massacre of officers and civil servants and intellectuals and so on. Two of them I am not competent to comment on: The letter that appeared in "The Economist" and the writings of the Australian student. But I do have some particular knowledge of the work of Francois Ponchaud and of the statements by Dr. Oum Nal, to whom you refer, because we have worked intimately with them both.

Having not read the review of Ponchaud's book—I don't know whether the review of it is accurate, but I don't really think that is relevant to the question of his personal findings—Ponchaud assisted us extensively in our interviews in France. He compared data with us, criticized our work, and challenged in some cases our findings. We found him to be a very honest scholar, one, incidentally, who, in his way, is as critical of the policies of the United States, France, as some of the witnesses today.

However, it is the judgment of Father Ponchaud that between April 17, 1975, and January 1, 1977—it was his initial judgment—that at least 800,000 people perished in Cambodia.

In the late spring or early summer of 1976, Ponchaud returned to the camps, made further interviews, and told us he was sure that his original estimate of 800,000 was unrealistically low.

As for his statements that in some areas people fared better than others, that there was no policy of massacre, I believe that he was referring to those areas that have long been under Khmer Rouge domination.

Our data about what happened in those areas are fragmentary, but it is logical that the rule there would be somewhat different than among the people, the 4 million or so exiles, who were regarded as enemies.

The statement of Dr. Oum Nal, far from showing that there was no policy of massacre or extermination of intellectuals or classes, actually proves just the reverse, because, he suffered a long ordeal, incarceration, and lived under barbaric conditions for a while. He swept the floors at a hospital outside of Sisophon, as I remember, the chief doctor of which was a former practical nurse who had worked under him in Phnom Penh. And the nurse, now chief doctor, befriended him, but the whole body of his testimony shows that engineers, educated people, were being singled out and oppressed and, in some cases, killed or at least they vanished.
The fact is that he did—he was the one person we could find—go to a special village for reeducation, from which he chose to flee.

The Khmer Rouge and their apologists in the West repeatedly have stated that the people had to be moved from the cities to the countryside where food had been stockpiled, medical facilities were awaiting them.

We simply, after talking to more than 300 people, with rare exceptions, could find no evidence that any provision had been made to provide these millions of people with food or medical care. Such food as was distributed would appear to have come from American stocks captured in Phnom Penh. It would have been much easier, if you wanted to disburse this food, to have done it there.

A final thing I would say regarding the deaths in Cambodia: We know that the orders were issued to execute former military personnel and civil servants, teachers and students. We know that some intellectuals were the victims of organized massacres, apparently for no reason other than their education or class.

But I submit that the greatest and most calculated number of deaths has occurred by virtue of the conditions into which these people have been consigned and enslaved. I must say that the individual executions, according to our data, do continue, but who is there left to massacre by class now?

If you look at the latest published data, you see the conditions of life are such that people are dying and will continue to die.

Mr. Solarz. What do you think we should do about this?

Mr. Barron. I think we should speak out about it. I agree with you that, to do nothing, is to condone murder and to sully ourselves. But, as a practical matter, the people who most likely would be able to exercise some influence are the Chinese and, to an extent, the North Vietnamese, with whom they are fighting now and then.

And I think, as a first step, you could start there, ask them. And, second, you could challenge the United Nations to do something about it.

And, if all these data—Oh, I want to say one other thing. If the Congress has any doubt about the number of deaths there, if there is any doubt about the Cambodian regime using the figure 5 million, I would suggest that you inquire of agencies of the government, and I would suggest that they can provide you with evidence quite beyond the Khieu Samphan interview. Other Cambodian officials at approximately the same time had stated that there were 5 or 5.2 million inhabitants of Cambodia. The figure of 7.7 million mentioned by Mr. Porter, I have seen stated one time, and that was in a claim made shortly after the first anniversary of the revolution that all of the reports about massacres and starvation and death were maliciously false and the population now is 7.7 million. I don't know of anybody in the world who has ever contended that the population of Cambodia ever was that large.

Mr. Porter. Could I respond to several of these points? First of all, with regard to this interview of Khieu Samphan, it should be stated for the record—and I will provide that interview for the hearing record—Khieu Samphan did explicitly deny in that interview that these charges of massive reprisals did in fact take place. He denied, in other words, that the policies attributed to him were in fact the case.
I want to just underline, if I understand correctly what Mr. Barron is saying—you do agree then that it is the case that the intellectuals were not in fact targeted for extermination by—

Mr. BARRON. No, I don't agree with that at all. I didn't say that.

Mr. PORTER. Perhaps you could clarify.

Mr. BARRON. I said we do not have evidence that all intellectuals have been killed. We do have evidence that a goodly number were, particularly students and teachers, some engineers. But we do not—I cannot substantiate a statement that all were killed.

Mr. PORTER. The point I want to make is that Dr. Om Now in this very long article in La Figaro states quite clearly that there were 637 intellectuals who were brought together, including engineers, students, teachers, and so forth, at the beginning of this period. He talks about an unknown number of them who were taken away during the midst of the indoctrination or reeducation, and it was apparent—it appeared the first time he mentioned it that they were taken away and killed. Later on, they reappear at a point where it is clear that they were taken away for special treatment, but not killed. No where in this article does he indicate that the people in his group to be reeducated—that any of them were killed. Clearly, the purpose of reeducation was not to kill.

So my point is that this certainly proves that there was not a general policy, although I am obviously in no position to say that no intellectuals were killed, nor would I argue that. But there was not a general policy of extermination of intellectuals because of their class background. It seems to me on the face of it simply untrue.

Mr. BARRON. I would have to, if I may just add this—in his interview with us, the physician mentioned pretty much what you have recounted there, but, additionally, he reported the disappearance of some colleagues at different times who never were seen again.

And I submit that disappearance in Cambodia has a pretty sinister connotation, and I would say further that he left early on, in April of 1976. The second wave of massacres, aimed against the noncommissioned officers, the enlisted personnel, the lower ranking civil servants, the teachers and students, did not begin until early 1976, until after the completion of the first harvest. And so this is certainly evidence, I would agree, that, as of April 1976, not all intellectuals had been killed and some were being reeducated but, given the orders that were issued and of which non-Communist governments are aware, by virtue of the manner in which they were issued, and given the evidence that some of them were executed—that is, people were massacred—I think we can only conclude that a goodly number of people were killed pursuant to those orders.

Mr. FRASER. Have there been any diplomatic personnel in and out of Phnom Penh in the last year who have managed to convey their impressions?

Mr. POOLE. Mr. Chairman, in the article by David Andelman yesterday in the New York Times, he apparently has talked to those who have gotten to Bangkok. You can't go directly from Phnom Penh to Bangkok. I think they must have been on leave in Bangkok and that sort of thing.¹

¹ See article in appendix 5, p. 67.
Whether Andelman got to Peking or Hanoi to talk to diplomatic personnel, there is now commercial air traffic between Hanoi and Phnom Penh via Saigon, and Peking and Phnom Penh, so you get two kinds of diplomatic personnel.

One kind is the type that just gets in for a quick trip to present their credentials and gets sort of an impressionistic view and possibly gets to talk to others in the diplomatic corps there—or perhaps does not even get that.

And there are those who spend substantial tours there, but again are pretty well confined in Phnom Penh.

Mr. Fraser. But, I mean, have we learned anything about their impressions?

Mr. Poole. I think a lot of people—I think there have been a lot of impressions gained from them; yes.

Mr. Barron. But only about Phnom Penh.

Mr. Fraser. To what effect?

Mr. Poole. Pretty well confirming the negative side of the regime.

Mr. Fraser. In other words, the larger number of people have died?

Mr. Poole. Yes; I don't think that that is widely disputed.

Mr. Porter. If I may, I would just like to sort of finish that point that I started to make, which was that I don't think that there is any way that one can argue, given the evidence presented by one of the key witnesses, if you will, and given your statement that the order supposedly went out in January of 1976 to kill all intellectuals—here is this man who was in reeducation precisely at the time when the orders are to go into effect. Four months later he is released from reeducation and goes into normal civil life.

Mr. Barron. That isn't what happened.

Mr. Porter. He received his black costume and his scarf and was assigned to normal economic duties.

Mr. Barron. What I meant didn't happen is that the orders for the massacres were issued in 1975. The commanders were told to prepare for them after the completion of the harvest.

At the time of the doctor's escape, he was still in the village where he was going to be presumably reeducated, and he was told his reeducation would take several years at least, according to his statements.

Mr. Porter. He doesn't say that in here at all. In fact, he says something quite different. I would like to have the committee translate this, if you are interested in following up on this point.

But I also want to question the nature of the so-called orders which you allege are so clear cut. Ponchaud claims to have some sort of documentation in one article that he writes of the language of an order which was given to district officials in one province, Monkouberi Province, in January 1976, and he quotes from this:

To construct democratic Kampuchea while renewing everything on a new basis. Destroy everything which recalls the colonial imperialist culture, not only on the ground but also in the people. To rebuild new Kampuchea, 1 million people is sufficient. There is no more need to prisoners of war who are left to the absolute discretion of local chiefs.

Now this quotation, which Ponchaud presents as though it were an actual official text, I assume must be a reconstruction from refugee accounts.

Mr. Barron. I know nothing about that.
Mr. Porter. It seems to me that this is being presented as a form of documentation which I simply do not believe that Ponchaud himself has nor any refugee has, so again we are presented with a problem of misrepresentation of a kind of documentation. I simply question whether this is in fact an accurate reconstruction of the so-called order.

Mr. Chandler. I would like to come in here, Mr. Chairman, if I may. I know it is getting late, but it seems to me that what I want to say would tie in with several other things that have been said. I think the problem of information is a serious one, and it worries me very much. If nothing bad is happening in Cambodia, the regime doesn’t have to let in the New York Times, but they could let in more newsmen than they do, which is just about nobody. The first newsmen admitted into Cambodia, to travel around—a Romanian—went in only this year, 2 years after the liberation of Phnom Penh.

In early 1976 when diplomats visited the site of what the regime said was an American or American-induced bombing, one man, the Swedish Ambassador, tried to talk to some eye witnesses, but he was not allowed to do so. He was told by a spokesman what had happened. We are being told what is happening, all the time. If the regime had a policy of systematic extermination of the intellectuals—and I don’t have evidence that they did—it would seem to me completely unlikely, given the history of the movement, and the history of the ideology of the leaders, for them to announce this policy in any accessible form.

The regime, in other words, doesn’t have much of a documentary sense. In that sense, as a gentleman here was saying in one of the recesses, we can count the number of Jews who were killed in the war because the Germans kept records of each one that they killed. The Cambodians never did. Nor, may I add, did we, when we were killing them.

Now, this doesn’t mean that they don’t have such a policy. I think we have to—I know the phrase “open mind” doesn’t sound perhaps, you know, high toned enough, but, an open mind is what we need because we have to get information. Information is what we do not have.

People are piecing things together, it seems to me, largely to make cases, and although what is happening in Cambodia does not seem to me to be happy for the people who are there, I only wish that there could be more information. This would be the kind of thing that should be uncontroversial, but helpful, as a statement that we could make in some public forums, asking Cambodians to tell us: Why isn’t there more information from your country? Instead, I notice when Ieng Sary, the Cambodian Foreign Minister, went around Southeast Asia recently, he gave very few press conferences, and answered very few questions.

Now, I don’t say he must have something to hide, but it would seem to me that, if he had nothing to hide, what would be wrong with a press conference, what is wrong with a little more knowledge? If a little more knowledge would show us—and I hope it is true—that Mr. Porter is right, this would mean less people have been killed than some other people are saying, and I would be glad to have that information. Information, I think, is the crux of the issue, and the lack of it, and my own sadness, are the two notes I wish to strike.
Mr. Porter. If I may just make one concluding statement, I do agree with Mr. Barron on one point, and that is I think the problem of illness, particularly malaria, is far more serious in suffering and death than any question of purge of classes or former Lon Nol personnel. That clearly is a serious problem in postwar Cambodia. It was a very serious problem during the war.

Cambodian officials have said that, for every person killed and wounded on their side during the war, there were two who were afflicted with malaria.

And I find it incomprehensible that Congressman Solarz would suggest in a demeaning way—would refer to the one gesture, if you can call it that, that the United States has made to postwar Cambodia, which was to sell it DDT as an antimalarial—that he should refer to that in a demeaning tone. This is the one thing, however inconsequential, that the United States has done to alleviate in some way postwar Cambodia's suffering, which I agree wholeheartedly has been serious, enormous by any standard.

And I must say that I find it difficult to understand, given the situation in postwar Cambodia, why the regime has not done more to ask for postwar assistance from international agencies who would be perfectly willing to help, although it should be added that quite early on the Cambodians did approach private organizations in this country and in Europe for this kind of antimalarial assistance.

So they were not insensitive to the problem. I think there were political reasons why they did not approach either the Soviet Union or any of its allies or international organizations, which they, for reasons which are—which were somewhat obscure, just distrust intensively.

But I do think it is more useful to focus on the concrete problem of a serious nature of illness and particularly malaria in postwar Cambodia, the lack of medicine, the lack of trained medical personnel, and to explore what could be done in that regard, if, in fact, people have a moral concern to help the Cambodian people.

Mr. Fraser. I gather all of the witnesses are prepared to see humanitarian assistance go to Cambodia.

Mr. Chandler. What the Cambodians call “so-called humanitarian assistance”.

Mr. Fraser. Well, I must say it has been a lively discussion. I recognize, Dr. Chandler, that some of the members expressed views that obviously you didn't appreciate very much. I haven't been able to find any way to run congressional hearings in which members aren't, in effect, free to—

Mr. Chandler. I don't think this is the forum for that type of thing. I was only trying to get some information across, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Fraser. I understand. A number of you made references to be put in the record. We will be glad to have them and include them. If there is anything further that you want to submit, I hope you will feel free to do so. We certainly won't close the record immediately.

Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX 1

[From the Economist (London), Mar. 26, 1977]

LETTER TO THE EDITOR FROM W. J. SAMPSON 1

CAMBODIAN CASUALTIES

Sir—My first impression is that some of the "stark statistics" about the killing in Cambodia (February 26th) are wrong.

I worked as an economist and statistician in Phnom Penh until the end of March, 1975; my job involved close contact with the government's central statistics office. I agree with the estimate of 7m population in 1970. There seems however to be little evidence to support the figure of "1m killed during the war". A report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific gives 7.89m population for mid-1974; my own independent estimate for end-August, 1974, was also 7.89m. My figures took account of the following:

(a) Natural increase.
(b) Higher infant mortality during war.
(c) Reported massacre of and emigration of Vietnamese after 1970, partly offset by some net Vietnamese immigration.
(d) Other net immigration.
(e) Armed forces deaths, both sides.
(f) Civilian war deaths.

The size of the combatant forces on both sides was put at 100,000–150,000 by military attaches, and deaths ran at about 500 a week for both sides towards the end of the war. Civilian killings could be numbered perhaps in tens of thousands, but not more. Your figure of 1m killed during the war thus seems far too high.

In August, 1974, the population of the Greater Phnom Penh conurbation was 1.9m, including refugees, monks, soldiers and their families; other urban areas under government control had about 600,000. A further 1½m were in rural areas controlled by the government. By April, 1975, the urban population may have reached 3m and it is this number which would have been told to move to the countryside, partly because of a typhoid risk in Phnom Penh. However they did not go into the jungles. There is little jungle around Phnom Penh and Bat Dambang, the main reception areas, and there would be little point in sending people into jungle when there was so much abandoned riceland available.

After leaving Cambodia I visited refugee camps in Thailand and kept in touch with Khmers. We heard about the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh. A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall saw and heard of no other executions. Only one refugee reported elimination of collaborators and this at third hand. I feel that such executions could be numbered in hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands. There was a big death toll from sickness (our landlord is reported to have died of malaria and an ex-servant to have lost a child). Rice is reported to have been short, in spite of large black market hoards in cities, and so are medical supplies, though pharmacies had many months stock in Phnom Penh. Fish was, however, plentiful and there were plenty of vegetables available around Phnom Penh and Bat Dambang.

One cause of depopulation was emigration. Large numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese were made to walk to Vietnam, whilst other foreigners (except a few Lao) were expelled to Thailand. Many Khmer too escaped, mainly peasants and fishermen from border provinces. Few, however, escaped from Phnom Penh.

We may in time get true figures after a new census or full registration, but till then a figure of 2.2m deaths seems questionable.

Brussels

W. J. SAMPSON

APPENDIX 2

ESSAYS FROM THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS ENTITLED "THE BLOODIEST REVOLUTION", MARCH 13, 1977, AND "CAMBODIA, CORRECTIONS", MAY 26, 1977, BY JEAN LACOUTURE

THE BLOODIEST REVOLUTION

(Cambodge, année zéro, by François Ponchaud. Julliard, 250 pp., 42F)

François Ponchaud is a French priest who spent ten years in Cambodia and left three weeks after the so-called "democratic" revolution took place in April, 1975. He spoke Khmer so well that he was made a member of a local committee of translators. Since being expelled with the rest of the foreigners he has made intensive efforts to find out what has happened in Cambodia, listening to the official radio, examining every available public document, compiling evidence from some hundred refugees in Thailand, Vietnam, and France.

His book Cambodge, année zéro is by far the best informed report to appear on the new Cambodia, the most tightly locked up country in the world, where the bloodiest revolution in history is now taking place. What Oriental despots or medieval inquisitors ever boasted of having eliminated, in a single year, one quarter of their own population? Ordinary genocide (if one can ever call it ordinary) usually has been carried out against a foreign population or an internal minority. The new masters of Phnom Penh have invented something original, auto-genocide. After Auschwitz and the Gulag, we might have thought this century had produced the ultimate in horror, but we are now seeing the suicide of a people in the name of revolution; worse: in the name of socialism.

Of course it is horrible when Pinochet tortures his prisoners, Amin strangles his enemies, and the extreme Franco-ist guerrillas massacre theirs; but what else do we expect from people whose main work is simply killing and who are ruled only by a tyrant's caprice? What has taken place in Cambodia during the last two years is of a different historical order. Here the leaders of a popular resistance movement, having defeated a regime whose corruption by compradors and foreign agents had reached the point of caricature, are killing people in the name of a vision of a green paradise. A group of modern intellectuals, formed by Western thought, primarily Marxist thought, claim to seek to return to a rustic Golden Age, to an ideal rural and national civilization. And proclaiming these ideals, they are systematically massacring, isolating, and starving city and village populations whose crime was to have been born when they were the inheritors of a century of historical contradictions during which Cambodia passed from a paternalistic feudalism, through colonization, to a kind of precapitalism manipulated by foreigners.

François Ponchaud's book not only gives shocking, detailed, and carefully authenticated testimony confirming earlier reports of mass suffering being inflicted on the Cambodians. He quotes from texts distributed in Phnom Penh itself inciting local officials to "cut down," to "gash," to "suppress" the "corrupt" elites and "carriers of germs"—and not only the guilty but "their offspring until the last one." The strategy of Herod. He cites telling articles from the government newspaper, the Prachachat, including one of June 16, 1976, which denounced the "reeducation" methods of the Vietnamese as "too slow."

The Khmer method has no need of numerous personnel. We've overturned the basket, and with it all the fruit is contained. From now on we will choose only the fruit that suit us perfectly. The Vietnamese have removed only the rotten fruit, and this causes them to lose time. [Italics added]

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