Allen, George: (CIA-Retired) George Allen is a 30 year veteran of US military intelligence and the CIA. He is author of the book, None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam. Book Description from Amazon.com: From his vantage point as a chief official with the CIA and army intelligence, Mr. Allen reveals specifically how American leaders, unwilling to face up to bad news from intelligence sources, largely excluded intelligence from important policy deliberations until it was too late. Reviews: From Publishers Weekly: Few Americans knew more about the inner workings of American Vietnam War policy over as long a period of time as Allen did. A WWII navy veteran, Allen went to work as a midlevel civilian defense department intelligence analyst after the war. In 1964, he switched to the CIA, where he served in a similar capacity until his 1979 retirement. Allen spent virtually all of that time in Vietnam and Washington compiling firsthand intelligence about the French and American wars; he tells (what seems like) all in this wide-ranging, illuminating memoir. One message shines through this recounting of more than three decades of American policy-making in Vietnam, what Allen calls the "unwillingness of U.S. officials to confront reality in Vietnam." Allen names the names of those officials. They included the three top Army generals sent to South Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s (Joseph "Lightning Joe" Collins, Samuel T. "Hanging Sam" Williams and Paul Harkins); the ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964-1965, Maxwell Taylor; and Johnson administration heavies Walt Rostow, McGeorge and William Bundy and Robert S. McNamara. Those men and many others preferred to make their own strategic and tactical decisions, nearly all of which were doomed. Allen makes a strong case that the "failure" of the book's subtitle was not one of misreported or incorrect analysis; it was of not being able to convince the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon administrations that they were pursuing the wrong course in the Vietnam War. (Sept. 14) Forecast: While this is not the less technical analysis most lay readers will want, historians and other pundits will add it to their arsenals in the continuing re-evaluation of the war and its aging and departed players. Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.